By contrast, the Soviet government takes generally 

 an active and directing role in S&T policy and devel- 

 opment. Just as industrial advance is the product of 

 state initiative and administration, the spur to in- 

 novation also comes from central political authori- 

 ties. Through state ownership of R&D results and de- 

 tailed plans the government intervenes directly from 

 beginning to end of the research-to-production cycle. 

 Administrative bodies deliberately plan and introduce 

 new products and processes. The mode of advance is 

 predominantly innovation by order from the top down; 

 administrative levers and bureaucratic instruments 

 are relied on to drive the whole process. Thus the 

 Soviet government stresses organizational and proce- 

 dural solutions to science and technology problems. 



It is important not to overdraw the image of two 

 sharply dichotomous models of science and technology 

 for the US and USSR. The Soviet system is neither as 

 unique nor as monolithic as it is sometimes assumed 

 to be. Though highly centralized, the S&T establish- 

 ment is also heavily compartmentalized among numerous 

 functional agencies and institutional subsystems. Al- 

 though military R&D is systematically managed, Soviet 

 civilian S&T is less centralized. The GKNT has only 

 partially succeeded as general overseer by concentra- 

 ting on a limited number of priority areas rather 

 than all R&D activities. Nor is the American system 

 as anarchic and freewheeling as it seems at first 

 glance. Government regulation of innovation dampens 

 the entrepreneurial spirit. Contradictory impulses 

 and policies coexist in both environments. Each sys- 

 tem excels in certain respects and falls short in 

 others. 



To underline the comparative dimensions of Ameri- 

 can and Soviet approaches, the following discussion 

 focuses on three major areas of S&T policy: (1) rela- 

 tionship of scientific R&D to industry; (2) the use 

 of indicators and measurement techniques in policy 

 planning and management; and (3) incentives and ob- 

 stacles to innovation. Finally, the new complexity 

 barriers that both countries face today in framing 



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