also introduced systems planning and programming into 

 their intrabranch operations. Simple evaluative meth- 

 ods and manual calculations are on the whole preferred 

 over highly sophisticated analytic techniques and com- 

 plex mathematical formulas. By and large, the abacus, 

 not the computer, remains the standard tool. 



In both countries, then, scientific R&D still falls 

 generally into the realm of poorly structured decision 

 problems for which modern systems analysis and scien- 

 tific management techniques are not very useful. Such 

 formal methods have been mainly reserved for massive 

 development projects, especially those resulting in 

 the production and operation of advanced hardware. The 

 unpredictability of fundamental and some applied re- 

 search resists planning and control by such methods. 

 Decision makers in both countries will continue to re- 

 ly on a mix of formal and informal instruments, eval- 

 uation by colleagues, and subjective experience. In 

 short, science policy in both nations will remain an 

 inexact science. 



INCENTIVES AND OBSTACLES TO INNOVATION 



The basic systemic differences between the two na- 

 tions foster divergent approaches to another important 

 area of science policy: incentives and obstacles to 

 innovation. Though the United States and the Soviet 

 Union both have special policies and mechanisms in di- 

 rect support of innovation, indirect influences are 

 probably more significant. Forces and government 

 policies bearing on basic economic activity have an 

 effect as well on R&D, whether intentionally or not. 

 By shaping the general economic climate and value sys- 

 tem of management, broadly aimed government actions 

 can stimulate or constrain innovation. Policies de- 

 vised explicitly to promote technological advance or 

 to guide its direction may, in fact, have relatively 

 small influence. 



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