and interested in effecting the transition of scien- 

 tific results into application have been lacking. The 

 task of innovation has generally fallen outside the 

 domain of either R&D or production facilities. The 

 critical functions have not received the management 

 attention they deserve. To be sure, the Soviet Union 

 has demonstrated the ability to innovate, but usu- 

 ally in a few select priority areas. It has not de- 

 monstrated a capacity for technological innovation 

 along a broad front. In general, the development of 

 a new product requires either breaking into the sys- 

 tem with the support of higher authorities or creat- 

 ing new organizations outside the regular channels. 

 On the one hand, the rigidities of the existing sys- 

 tem of planning and management are eased by the pri- 

 ority attached to the innovation; on the other hand, 

 they are bypassed altogether. The system simply does 

 not accommodate easily unplanned and unsponsored in- 

 novations from without and from below. 



INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO NEW COMPLEXITY 

 OF S&T PROBLEMS 



Science policy is acquiring enhanced importance in 

 both the US and the USSR as each rests its future 

 largely on progress in science and technology. Many 

 of the pressing problems, facing both countries today 

 have strong S&T components as part either of their 

 cause or of their solution. Science and technology 

 are giving new direction and shape not only to nation- 

 al policies but to the international relations of the 

 two superpowers as well. What stands out about the 

 interactions of science, technology, and society is 

 that they are becoming increasingly complex and high- 

 ly contingent in both systems. The major challenge 

 before American and Soviet policy makers alike, then, 

 is how to integrate their science and technology en- 

 terprises to match the complexity of problems to be 

 solved. 



328 



