18 THE HVE-YEAR OUTLOOK 



4. Edward F. Denison. Accounting for Slower Economic Growrh. 

 Washington. DC: Brookings Institution. 1979 



5. U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Advisory Commiitee on 

 Industrial Innovation: Final Report. Washington. D.C.: U.S. Govern- 

 ment FYinting Othce. 1979. 



6. Mansfield, op cit. (Ref. 3). 



7. See. for example. Henry G. Grabowski and John M, Vernon. The 

 Impact of Regulation on Industrial Innovation. Washington. D.C.: 

 National Academy of Sciences. 1979. 



8. Edward D. David. "Industrial Research in America: Challenge of 

 New Synthesis." Science. Vol. 209 (July 4. 1980). pp. 133-139. 



9. Industrial Innovation and Public Policy Options. Washington. 

 D.C.: National Academy of Engineering. 1980. 



10. National Commission on Research. Industry and the Universities. 

 Washington. D.C.: National Commission on Research. 1980. See also 

 Denis J. Prager and Gilbert S. Omenn. "Research. Innovation, and 

 University-Industry Linkages." Science. Vol. 207 (January 25. 1980). 

 pp. 379-384. 



11. National Commission on Research, op. cit (Ref 101. 



12. Ibid. 



13. Donalds. Fredrickson. "Biomedical Research in the 1980s." Wcm' 

 England Journal of Medicine. Vol. 304 (February 26. 1981). pp. 

 509-517. 



14. Universityllndustry Cooperation. New York. NY: New York Uni- 

 versity. Center for Science and Technology Policy. June 1980. 



D. The International Context of U.S. Science and Technology 



Increasingly, the products of science an(i technology force 

 issues that are traditionally domestic in character into an 

 international context and also place new issues on the 

 international agenda (AAAS-6). During the next 5 years. 

 events and trends outside the United States will likewise 

 have impacts both on the conduct of U.S. science and 

 technology and on the relationships of science and tech- 

 nology to U.S. domestic problems. 



Such trends and developments can conveniently be 

 divided into four categories: 



( 1 ) Developments in science and technology that the U . S . 

 science and technology enterprises, and therefore the 

 United States, can use to their own advantage; 



(2) Developments and trends in science and technology 

 and in science and technology policy that could affect 

 the competitive economic, diplomatic, or military 

 standing of the United States; 



(3) Problems and opportunities of a transnational charac- 

 ter related to advances in science and technology that 

 are likely to affect the United States or the U.S. 

 science and technology enterprise; and 



(4) Global problems affecting international stability that 

 U.S. science and technology might help resolve. 



Developments and trends in the first two categories 

 raise the broad problem of how best to balance the desir- 

 ability for international cooperation in science and tech- 

 nology with the need for the United States to maintain its 

 competitive position next to countries whose science and 

 technology are roughly comparable to ours. The two 

 categories primarily involve relations between the United 

 States and the industrialized democracies and between the 

 United States and the U.S.S.R. 



Examples of problems in the third category include 

 those associated with international resource management. 



the global environment, and international information and 

 communications capabilities. They involve U.S. relations 

 with all of the industrialized countries and. additionally, 

 with a number of less developed countries that have some 

 advanced science and technology capabilities, including 

 Mexico. Brazil, India, Pakistan. Korea, and several 

 OPEC countries. 



Problems in the fourth category are related to the peren- 

 nial, overriding issue of world poverty. They include 

 population and the adequacy of world food and energy 

 supplies and involve U.S. relations with all countries of 

 the world. 



U.S. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY RELATIVE 

 TO OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES 



Human and financial resources available for the conduct 

 of R&D remain considerably greater in the United States 

 than in any of the leading industrialized democracies, 

 principally the Western European countries, Canada, and 

 Japan. However, several of those countries are closing the 

 gap in terms of total investments, and, significantly, in- 

 vestments in those countries are concentrated in areas 

 closely related to productivity and economic growth 

 (Sl-80). In addition, U.S. preeminence in both science 

 and technology is being increasingly challenged from 

 abroad (See Sections I-B and 1-C). 



Whether the gaps will continue to narrow or whether, 

 on the contrary, investments in R&D elsewhere will de- 

 cline or plateau at lower levels than in the United States (as 

 they have in the United Kingdom and France) cannot be 

 answered at this time. Certainly the other countries have 

 also been experiencing economic problems that may af- 

 fect their abilities to maintain and develop science and 

 technology bases. However, in view of the current eco- 



