1583 



It is generally assumed that trade is a means of encouraging more 

 amicable and stable relations among nations. U.S. interest in Soviet 

 trade has tended to reach beyond this generality: 



Although somewhat inconsistent in application, a policy of reward-penalty 

 appeared to be followed by the United States, apparently with three objectives: 



(1) To encourage detente by reducing weapons development, lowering 

 force levels, and moderating crisis management; 



(2) To encourage detente through moderation and reform of the Soviet 

 regime's domestic policies, including religious tolerance, economic reform, 

 freedom of expression, and the right to emigrate; 



(3) To encourage polycentrism in the Commimist world, detente in the 

 foreign policies of the individual Communist countries other than the U.S.S.R., 

 and moderation in their domestic policies, (p. 040) 



U.S. interest in the effects of expanded trade and detente with the 

 Soviets raises ambiguities in at least four areas: As to wlietlier the 

 U.S.S.R. exerts a moderating influence on world tensions or helps 

 foment dissensions; as to whether Soviet priorities need to shift to 

 meeting consumer requirements or to remain fixed on strategic mili- 

 tary weapons; as to whether Soviet internal controls are easing to 

 encourage modernization and professionalism or tightening over civil 

 liberties, emigration, and access to foreign media; and as to increased 

 or decreased independence of satellite countries. 



On the commercial side, the question persists as to how good a 

 customer the U.S.S.R. can be. One view, ofi'ered in the study, is that 

 "increasing U.S. sales in agribusiness facilities, petroleum and natural 

 gas equipment, computer systems, and a variety of other high- 

 technology lines may be an effective wedge into the wSoviet market; 

 once begun, these sales tend to accelerate over time", (p. 572) This 

 principle was extended in the discussion to apply generally to advanced 

 industrial systems, management-control-communications systems, 

 mass production machinery building, agribusiness as both a system 

 and a series of technologies, and tourist systems. The hypothesis is 

 offered that requirements for imports in these areas "appear to 

 represent a pattern of technical and managerial relatedness that 

 would limit the ability of Soviet leaders to take short-term advantages, 

 borrow technology, and then withdraw from continued U.S. -Soviet 

 economic relations in ])articular lines." (pp. 578-574) 



BARRIERS TO TR.A.DE EXPANSION 



Again from the U.S. point of view, there are major barriers to the 

 proposed trade expansion. One is the unfamiliarity of U.S. business- 

 men with Soviet foreign trade techniques. Corporate rights are some- 

 what imprecisely defined. "One feature of Soviet state trading to 

 which Western businessmen object is the necessity of dealing with 

 Soviet foreign trade enterprises." There is no direct contact with 

 Soviet producers, consumers, and (hstributors. (p. 591) There is also 

 a tendency for Soviet traders to "insist on barter trade, tied trans- 

 actions, and other clumsy arrangements." Other barriers are the 

 limited Soviet export capability, the doubtful adaptability of Soviet 

 trade institutions to large-scale economic cooperation, and U.S. 

 resistance to exports with possible "national security" implications, 

 (p. 593) 



The report concluded that further trade negotiations between the 

 United States and the Soviet Union, to ease the indicated barriers, 



