174S 



mainly political, and there are both political and economic reasons 

 for balancing this U.S. policy against the needs for preserving other 

 •essential political and economic relationships abroad.) 



ISSUE one: the evolution of international technology 



This paper, written about 2 years after President Nixon took oflBce, 

 took account of the President's early effort to shift the primary em- 

 phasis of U.S. foreign policy in technology from bilateral to multilateral 

 institutions. In his first message to Congress on U.S. foreign policy, 

 the President emphasized Western Hemisphere programs: "He urged 

 that bilateral relations be replaced by a multilateral approach, de- 

 veloped multilaterally." ^^ 



With respect to more general foreign assistance, the President 

 "again stressed the importance of multilateral rather than bilateral 

 relations, and of the need for the developing countries to take the 

 initiative in charting their own development strategies." ^^^ 



In his message the President cited two reports, referred to in the 

 study as the Peterson and the Pearson Reports. The Peterson Report, 

 March 4, 1970, told the President that: 



"For the first time in history, it appears feasible to approach this world prob- 

 lem [i.e., international development] on a worldwide basis." The report called for a 

 less prominent and obtrusive role for the United States in extending aid to de- 

 veloi:)ing countries. It urged greater partnership with developing countries, with 

 the aided countries carrying out more of the strategic planning. It urged re- 

 peatedly that bilateral assistance should be reduced and multilateral assistance in- 

 creased. The goal should be the achievement by the aided countries of a self- 

 sustaining posture of development. To implement the proposed change in emphasis 

 of the U.S. aid program, the task force recommended the establishment of four 

 institutions. These were (1) a U.S. International Development Bank, (2) a U.S. 

 International Development Institute, (3) the Overseas Private Investment 

 Corporation (OPIC) which the task force noted had already been authorized by 

 the Congress, and (4) a U.S. International Development Council.^*^ 



The Pearson Report, issued in the previous year under U.N. aus- 

 pices, recognized the deficiencies of multilateral agencies and pro- 

 grams. There were reasons, it said, why nearly 90 percent of develop- 

 ment assistance in 1967 was bilateral: 



Apart from historical colonial relationships, bilateral aid was often more efl5- 

 cient. Personnel recruitment was less of a problem. Bilateral programs could be 

 more flexible and experimental in their procedures. They could encompass a wider 

 scope of responses to real need.'" 



The Pearson Report also identified as political considerations some 

 asserted weaknesses of multilateral programs: 



Most countries will usually feel that at least some multilateral agencies are 

 unduly dominated by the "wrong" countries, whether aid-givers or recipients; or 

 that they are following erroneous aid philosophies, either too hard or too soft, too 

 interventionist, or too lax; or that they are simply badly run and that their pro- 

 •cedures are slow and expensive, (p. 209)'^* 



Nevertheless, the Report continued, there were favorable aspects to 

 multilateral aid: 



It reduced any overtones of charity or interventionism. It helped provide a 

 framework within which bilateral aid to whole nations could be better integrated 



^* Huddle, The Evolution of International Technology, vol. II, p. 669. 



385 Ibid. 



38»7f)id.,p. 670. 

 387 Ibid., p. 67,3. 

 318 Ibid. 



