1535 



Eiimtoin to establish, for U.S. -supplied materials, a safeguard systeiu 

 meeting U.S. standards, developed with U.S. tccdinical assistance, and 

 indirectly monitored through frecpient consultations and visits. 

 Euratom also agreed to consult with the IAEA to assure that its safe- 

 guard and control system would be compatible with lAEAs. 



The bilateral agreement further ])rovided that if the IAEA should 

 establish an international safeguard and control system, the United 

 States and Euratom would explore its assvnnption of the safeguard 

 function for all Euratom activities. 



The U.vS. relationship with Euratom has been a joint operational one, 

 however cautious; that with the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, 

 despite U.S. membership in it, has followed more conventional lines 

 of international cooperation and exchange. Dr. Donnelly comments 

 on this apparent inconsistency as follows: 



Since both the NEA and Euratom were created to fester commercial use of 

 nuclear energy in Europe, and since the membership of NEA represented until 

 recently a larger potential market for the U.S. nuclear power industry than the 

 six Euratom members, it seems curious that U.S. support to Euratom has so 

 exceeded that for NEA. For the latter there are no joint undertakings with U.S. 

 funding. One significant difference between the two multinational organizations 

 may explain the difference in U.S. support. This, in the opinion of the writer, 

 was the presence of the United Kingdom in NEA but not in Euratom. During 

 the mid-1950s the U.S. nuclear industry was concerned that the United Kingdom 

 with its strongly backed government program for development and application of 

 nuclear power would be able to capture much of the world's nuclear power 

 market. For the United States to have funded NEA projects may well have seemed 

 to give a principal competitor in the international nuclear market still greater 

 advantage. In these circumstances, U.S. support could not appear to benefit 

 nuclear power research and development of interest to the United Kingdom.-^ 



U.S. POSITION ON SAFEGUARDS 



The U.S. relationship to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ques- 

 tion of safeguards presents problems too complex and thorny to be 

 identified briefly without distortion; the reader is referred to the more 

 detailed treatment in pages 136-154 of the basic study. In general: 

 the United States has consistently supported the principle of inter- 

 national safeguards administered by the IAEA; on signing the NPT 

 on July 1, 1968, President Johnson offered to put commercial nuclear 

 power in the United States under IAEA safeguards, even though the 

 United States was exempt from them as a nuclear-weapons state. 

 Presidents Nixon and Ford reiterated this offer, but it has never been 

 carried out ; U.S. negotiations with IAEA over details were still in 

 j)rogress as of micl-1977. The ITnited States has also consistently sup- 

 |)orted the work of the IAEA Safeguards Committee. One of the most 

 important actions of the Committee — created in April 1970 to draft 

 safeguards agreements between the IAEA and individual nonnuclear 

 weapons states signatory to the NPT — was to specify the use of 

 national systems of accounting and control for nuclear materials. 

 Another important result of the Committee's work was to assure 

 that the legitimate commercial interests of states subject to inspection 

 would be protected. Most recently, the IAEA has begun to show lead- 

 ership in drafting international guidelines for physical security of 

 nuclear materials and facilities. 



=9 Ibid., p. 244. 



