1555 



Finally, there is highh^ suggestive evidonco that the new communications 

 •channels, the tremendous cooperative spirit, and the increased understanding 

 among participants of the 67 nations which took part in the IGY led directly 

 to the Antarctic Treaty. Whether or nut the IGY can be credited in such strong 

 terms, it clearly played an important part in helping shape that treaty, which 

 in turn reinforced the cooperative pattern for the other treaties and agreements 

 which v,'ere to follow. Just as scientists approach their objectives through a 

 step-by-step process, so did politicians appear to approach these international 

 objectives in similar fashion, with similar success. 5' 



Assessment 



How can the full significance of an undertaking as far-reaching in 

 its ramifications as tlie IGY be measured? 



Perhaps, by way of caution — especially because, as Bullis notes, 

 the record of the IGY as written by contemporary observers is full of 

 exuberant praise but apparently lacking in significant critical reac- 

 tion — the way to begin is with some negative considerations. He 

 observes that it seems tmfortiniate in retrospect that the occasion of 

 the IGY and its achievements was not systematically exploited in the 

 United States to influence lasting ptiblic attitudes toward basic 

 research : 



Unlike many of the activities of the K'.Y, which took place dramaticall.y in 

 remote and exciting areas of the globe, basic research was a difficult area of 

 scientific activitj' for the general public to understand and appreciate, and still 

 remains so. Although the IGY was, to scientists, primarily an exercise in basic 

 research, to the public it appeared largely a matter of polar adventures and space 

 satellites. Thus, were such an effort proposed today, it would appear doubtful 

 that it would receive widespread puljlic support unless the activities involved were 

 sufficientlj' broadened so as to appeal to a wide variety of interests. ^^ 



Again in retrospect, the new emphasis in education on science and 

 mathematics and on related curricuhun, test, and teaching reforms was 

 not entirel}" beneficial: 



Science careers may have been made attractive to some students who lacked 

 either the necessary qualifications or the sustained motivation required for such 

 careers. Furthermore, as Dean Harvey Brooks has pointed out, curriculum reform 

 was largely undertaken for the wrong reason, namely, ". . . on the grounds that 

 it was needed to make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counter- 

 parts," rather than because of a fundamental desire to improve the way in which 

 science was being taught. Thus, while the Sputnik motivation increased interest in 

 science and made changes easier, the danger also existed that both interest and 

 programs might collapse once the motivation subsided. ^^ 



In the context of the issue of the nuclear threat, possibly more sus- 

 tained and serious attention should have been given to the Soviet pro- 

 posal for a continuation of the IGY oiganization and procedures. 

 The spirit of cooperation engendered b}' the IGY itself, reaching not 

 only scientists but also the world's ])eoples and their political leaders 

 at a time when the prevaiUng atmosphere was one of cokl war hostility, 

 could perhaps have been captured and institutionalized in this way to 

 bring lasting benefits of a still higher order of magnitude than those 

 conferred by the IGY. Would the good will and flexibihty implicit in 

 such a response to the Soviet initiative have eased Soviet suspicions 

 of U.S. intentions in other areas, such as arms buildup, and made for 

 earlier and more certain solutions to pressing cold war problems? Or, 

 on the other hand, would tlie Soviet Union have attempted to convert 



51 Ihid.. p. .358.. 



5= Iliid., p. .33.".. 



53 Ihid., pp. 338-339. 



