1523 



freedom of action. Ilowevei-, Soviet neo;otiators stopped short of 

 suggesting an actual procedure. There was thus from the outset a wide 

 gulf between the U.S. plan and the Soviet approach, a gulf that never 

 appreciably narrowed. 



The work of the UNAEC proceeded for less than 4 years; a majonty 

 plan based on the U.S. proposals was accepted, 40-6-4, in a nonbincl- 

 ing U.N. General Assembly resolution, but rejected (by Soviet veto) 

 in the Security Council; by November 1949, the work of the UNAEC 

 had waned to the point where the General Assembly agreed to suspend 

 its activities. 



U.S. Involvement 



As suggested above, President Truman sought at the outset to 

 develop a broad base of understanding and participation in the process 

 of achieving international control of atomic energy. Secretary of War 

 Henry L. Stimson, asked by Truman to appoint a group to consider 

 both domestic and international control needs, brought leading 

 scientists together with key Government officials in the Secretary of 

 War's Interim Committee in May 1945. Vannevar Bush, eminent 

 scientist-engineer-administrator, and General Leslie Groves, head of 

 the Manhattan project which had developed the atom bomb, were 

 members of the Acheson committee formed in December 1945, along 

 with Har\'ard President James B. Conant and former Assistant Secre- 

 tary of War John McClo3^ The Board of Consultants appointed to 

 advise the committee consisted of TVA Chairman David Lilienthal, 

 New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. president Chester Barnard, Manhattan 

 project participant Harry A. Winne (an engineer and a vice president 

 of the General Electric Co.), and physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, 

 who had directed the Manhattan Project weaponry installation at Los 

 Alamos. The Acheson-Lilienthal report which resulted from meetings 

 of these two groups identified the basic technological factors that 

 would affect the development of an international control system antl 

 outlined a control plan governed by those factors. 



The delegation named to present the U.S. position to the United 

 Nations was of a different character. With financier Baruch were three 

 leading bankers, the head of the New York State Racing Commission, 

 and a scientific adviser who had served in that role with General 

 Groves. Baruch contributed a reputation for political acumen: it was 

 apparently hoped that he could help enlarge the administration's 

 freedom of action in international negotiations because he had the 

 confidence of Congress, which was concerned about giving away 

 secrets and thereby undermining the U.S. strategic position. 



There appear to have been significant diflferences in perspective 

 between those who developed the recommendations for a policy of 

 international control of atomic energy, representing mainly a technical 

 approach, and those who were responsible for conducting the diplo- 

 matic negotiations to implement the emerging policy. In any case, con- 

 tact between the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups 

 ended after a few meetings. There was fault on both sides: Baruch 

 resented open pubhcation of the Acheson-Lilienthal report; he asserted 

 that he would introduce his own ideas into the negotiations and con- 

 duct them in his own way; the members of the Acheson committee and 

 the Board of Consultants declined to serve under Baruch, partly on the 

 grounds that they wanted to retain the right to speak out in opposition 

 if Baruch pursued policies with which they disagreed. 



