1861 



nations have achieved what appears to be a fairly stable condition 

 of stalemate or "mutual deterrence." 



It was the hope of President Eisenhower, in advancing his proposed 

 "Atoms for Peace" initiative in 1953, to divert the energies of the 

 Soviets and other nations, as well as of the United States, away 

 from a nuclear arms race. The means was to be the diversion of 

 fissionable material to the generation of nuclear power. As an initiative 

 it had the merit of previous planning, purpose, and direction. How- 

 ever, by the time the plan had begun to take effect, the basis of 

 weaponry had shifted to thermonuclear fusion weapons (the "H- 

 Bomb"), so that the Atoms for Peace program did not significantly 

 reduce the availability of atomic explosives for military uses. 



After the Atoms for Peace initiative, long-range planning in the 

 nuclear field proceeded sporadically, with a mixture of objectives: 

 prevention of nuclear proliferation, exploitation of the U.S. monopoly 

 position in enrichment of nuclear fuel elements, control of nuclear 

 fuel, control of byproduct plutonium generated in nuclear power 

 reactors, development of the fuel-economizing breeder reactor, pro- 

 tection of populations against the spread of radioactive wastes, assist- 

 ance to developing countries in the acquisition of research reactors, 

 development of a nuclear power industry in Europe, pressing research 

 in the ultimate quest for power from nuclear fusion, and devising 

 technological means of "keeping ahead of the Russians" in weaponry 

 and delivery systems while also searching for a way to end or at least 

 retard the nuclear arms race. 



The sum total of all this effort seems to have been the achievement 

 of a condition lacking in military security and progressively more 

 hazardous as fissionable materials are placed in the custody of many 

 additional groups. The prospect is that weaponry will not diminish 

 as a threat, while the opportunity expands for additional nations or 

 groups to secure enough fissionable material to make a weapon for 

 threat or blackmail. 



Throughout this period, planning seems to have lagged consistently 

 behind the expanding risk. As the technology has spread, the U.S. 

 national security has diminished. The persuasiveness of international 

 control, tentatively advanced by the United States in 1947, has 

 become rationally compelUng in 1975. But the remarkable mixture of 

 goals and objectives being pursued by the United States, and the 

 absence of a coherent long-range planning process, appear to foreclose 

 effective control in 1977 as in 1947. The Donnelly study presents a 

 powerful array of questions urgently in need of attention. But current 

 anxieties over the energy situation and the consequent emphasis on 

 expanded resort to nuclear power appear to have further complicated 

 an already difficult set of problems. 



CASE three: the political legacy of the international 



GEOPHYSICAL YEAR 



The attention of this study was centered on the nongovernmental 

 scientific community, international in character and scope of interest. 

 The International Geophysical Year was planned in the halls of 

 science and largely executed as a basic scientific program, free of 

 government direction. This aspect of the IGY was an important 

 scientific success. 



