1522 



on the Baruch proposal ended in failure and the threat continues to 

 grow. 



Importance of the Case 



The arrival of atomic power was a technoloo;ical event of unparal- 

 leled significance for international affairs. It raised the cost of all-out 

 v>\arfare to an intolerable level and substantially altered the basis for 

 the positions of diplomats at the bargaining table. The problem of how 

 to establish control over both military and peaceful uses of atomic 

 energy posed an unprecedented challenge to world diplomacy. At 

 the outset, the technological necessities of effective international 

 control were politically unacceptable, especially to the Soviet Union. 

 For U.S. diplomacy the problem, seen in retrospect, was a test of 

 ability first to establish an atmosphere of confidence despite differing 

 political goals, then to fashion a step-by-step control program, keved 

 to common interests, which could serve as a basis for productive 

 negotiation. From the perspective of the Science, Technolog}^, and 

 American Diplomacystudy series, it was a major test of the capacity 

 of the United States to use its scientific, technological, and diplomatic 

 expertise in concert to solve a crucial world problem. 



How the Case Developed 



Once the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes had been 

 demonstrated to the world, the Truman Administration acted to 

 create public understanding of the bomb and its significance for the 

 United States. The Smyth report, containing a great deal of previously 

 classified, basic scientific information, Avas released in August 1945; 

 the President took initial steps toward enunciation of U.S. atomic 

 energy policy in two major addresses in October. On November 15 

 the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom laid a foundation 

 for international action to control atomic energy in the Three Nation 

 Agreed Declaration. 



In December the Soviet Union was made a party to the endeavor 

 in the signing of the Moscow Declaration. Earlier that month Assist- 

 ant Secretary of State Dean Acheson had been appointed to liead a 

 committee to report to the Secretary on U.S. policy for international 

 control. In January 1946, the United Nations Atomic Eneigy Com- 

 mission (UNAEC) was created, and a Board of Consultants headed 

 by TVA Chairman David Lilienthal was formed to assemble technical 

 advice for the Acheson committee. The findings of the Acheson com- 

 mittee and the Board of Consultants (which came to be known as the 

 Acheson-Lilienthal report) were released in March 1946. In the same 

 month, Baruch vcas appointed to represent the United States in the 

 UNAEC. 



The plan which Baruch presented to the UNAEC on June 14, 1946, 

 was a combination of his own ideas on international control of atomic 

 energy and the proposals of the Acheson-Lilienthal report. A central 

 feature of the plan was an international organization to which would 

 be entrusted all phases of the development and use of atomic energy. 

 The plan also called for inspection and for making violations of the 

 control agreement subject to punishment, and a proposal that the 

 veto power in the Security Council would not apply in voting on 

 sanctions, in a counterproposal on June 19, the Soviet Union rejected 

 the idea of waiving the veto and urged a total prohibition of atomic 

 weapons, promotion of peaceful development of atomic energy, and 

 agreement on international control but with retention of full sovereign 



