1526 



One of the factors which set the stage for faihire was the over- 

 estimation by U.S. leaders of the tactical advantage which monopoly 

 possession of atomic weapons gave the United States. ^^ As the author, 

 Leneice N. Wii, observes: 



While pxclusive possession of a new technology stemming from a scientific 

 discovery may give a nation an advantage in international affairs, that advantage 

 is likely to shrink quickly. In the case of nuclear energy, the principal disadvan- 

 taged country was able to duplicate the discovery of fission and to create a 

 rudimentary initial technology sufficient to permit detonation of a nuclear device 

 while the negotiations were still in progress. Yet during this time U.S. negotiators 

 apparently assumed that secrecy could preserve their advantage for a comfortably 

 long period of diplomatic accommodation. Thus [one] lesson from this study is 

 that it is unrealistic to rely on secrecy, once the application of a new technology 

 has been forcefully demonstrated before the world as in the case of the atomic 

 bombs, to prevent other nations from acquiring or recreating this technology. i' 



Whatever the reasons for failure of the Baruch plan negotiations, 

 they were characterized by insufficient teamwork and discontinuous 

 involvement of technologists in the diplomatic process. Possibly 

 Presidential and congressional encouragement of a continuing dialog 

 between the Baruch delegation and the Acheson-Lilienthal groups 

 could have helped to shape a U.S. position capable of contributing 

 to a successful conclusion of the negotiations. But existing procedures 

 and impetus were inadequate for dealing with the impact of a tech- 

 nological development of this size and complexity. 



GENERAL LESSONS FROM THE STUDY 



This study of the Baruch plan negotiations suggests some general 

 observations about the interrelationships of Science, Technology, and 

 American Diplomacy. Among those noted by the author are the 

 following: ^* 



— The creation and application of new technologies may so 

 change relations among nations that a system of international 

 control becomes desirable. Although probably the most dramatic 

 example to date, nuclear energy is neither the first nor the last 

 example of a technological innovation which suggests the need of 

 international machinery and procedures for controlling it. (Some 

 others are aviation, warships, supertankers, and communications 

 satellites.) 



— Intense riv^ahies among different national interests may 

 nevertheless tend to prevent the achievement of an appropriate 

 international control system. ''Not even an awareness of the 

 awesome destructive force of the atomic bomb provided sufficient 

 incentive to nations to agree on a secure form of control over 

 atomic energy." 



'2 Anothfir contributing factor was the pervasive lack of understanding of the facts of atomic technology 

 which prevailed at the time. The project director of this study series observes that after 30 years of exposure 

 to atomic technology it is hard to recall how little was generally known about the subject in 1915. For even 

 aliterateobserver of the political, military, and technical developments of that time, it took several readings 

 of the Smyth Report to get the full import of the technology. It is unlikely that many Washington bureau- 

 crats gave it as muoh as a single thorough reading. An informal random poll of 30 Washington professionals — 

 mainly government— taken a few weeks after the Smyth report had been released and at a time when it 

 had been much in the news, yielded only one person— a chemist— who had read it. This same source remarks 

 that in a conversation he had at this time with General Groves, the director of the Manhattan District 

 expressed complete confidence that the Soviets could not possibly produce an atomic weapon for at least 20 

 years. 



" Wu, Thv Baruch Plan: U.S. Diplomaci/ Kritirs the Nuclear .Xgc. \o\. T, p. W'h 



i< Ibid., pp. 118-122. 



