1528 



of tlie elements from science, teclmology, and diplomacy could be 

 expected to devise a workable system for control which would 

 be acceptable to the leading nations of the world." 



Anthor^s Reassessment 



The author of the study made the followins: comments 3 years 

 after the study was completed (summer 1972) : 



There appears to have been a general acceptance b}^ Congress of 

 Baruch as a competent negotiator in this area, an acceptance which 

 might not be as forthcoming today. The question is still relevant: to 

 what extent does Congress have a voice in, or can it effectively raise 

 questions regarding, the selection of a chief arms control negotiator? 

 In retrospect, and in light of developments since 1946, it would seem 

 appropriate for Congress to intensify its efforts to insure that persons 

 nominated for such critical diplomatic assignments as the negotiation 

 of arms control agreements were not unduly subject to a particular 

 professional, bureaucratic, special-interest, or other bias. 



NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT 



Although Congress had expressed an anxious determination to 

 retain the "secret" of the atomic weapon — a goal which has since 

 proven impossible — there was little congressional involvement in the 

 Baruch plan negotiations. Was the reluctance in Congress during 

 1974 ^* to transfer peaceful nuclear technology similarly based on the 

 notion that blocking this action would prevent the spread of weapons 

 technology? There is a greater need now than ever for Congress to 

 become intimately familiar with facts of nuclear technology, its 

 military and peaceful uses, and the vital question of accelerating 

 proliferation versus international controls. 



However, the issue of controlling nuclear energy presents a much 

 more complex set of circumstances now than it did in 1946. Congress 

 is called on to understand defense needs in the field of increasingly 

 complex and costly strategic weapons. Current arms control negotia- 

 tions, especially SALT, require congressional decisions to support or 

 reject a specific arms control program. In the face of growing demands 

 for peaceful uses of nuclear energy to overcome the energy shortfall in 

 many parts of the world, and with the offers of U.S. nuclear assistance 

 to Egypt and Israel last year and the addition of India to the nuclear 

 club, Congress has seen the need for, and sought, solutions to the 

 problems of nuclear proliferation. 



Further, in relation to such developments as the Vladivostok 

 accords,^® Congress will increasingly be called on to make timely 



" As Wu states in a chapter on Arms Control and Disarmament in Congress and Foreign Policy: 197^ 

 (prepared for the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Foreign 

 Affairs Division, Congressional Research Service; Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 15, 

 1975, p. 23): "A major issue in the Congress [in 1074] arose over the offer of U.S. assistance in the field of 

 nuclear technology to both Eygpt and Israel, during President Nixon's visits there in Jime. The primary 

 concern in Congress was the arms control implications: whether safeguards were adequate to prevent diver- 

 sion to weapons use, and whether such moves might contribute ultimately to the proliferation of nuclear 

 weapons. These fears were reinforced by the peaceful explosion of a nuclear device m May by India, using 

 nuclear material provided through an agreement with Canada for cooperation in peaceful uses." The author 

 adds that congressional concern for control was eventually translated into a number of different pieces of 

 legislation. 



'• I.e., the agreement in principle signed by President Ford and Soviet party leader Brezhnev at Vladi- 

 vostok in December 1974. The two leaders agreed to numerical ceilings on the offensive weapons systems 

 of each country. The S A LT teams of negotiators of both countries were to attempt to translate the statement 

 into a treaty by late 1975, when Brezhnev was scheduled to visit the United States, an event which had b^n 

 postponed several times. (As of niid-lOTV neither the treaty nor (he visit had materialized, but the negotia- 

 tions were still in progress.] 



