1533 



parties received a-^isiirances through a separate U.N. resohition^" of 

 certain protective measures by the parties possessing nuclear weapons. 

 The treaty also provided for a system of bilateral safeguards agree- 

 ments between the nonweapons countries and the IAEA. At the same 

 time, it obliged nuclear weapons parties not to transfer nuclear 

 weapons to other countries, to share the benefits of nuclear energy 

 with the other parties, and to support the efforts of the IAEA to 

 develop an effective safeguards S3^stem. 



U.S. Involvement 



As the first country to tap nuclear energ}^, and for a time the sole 

 possessor of the atom bomb, the United States was the principal force 

 behind virtuallv all of the early efforts to control and harness the 

 atom. It was the source of some constraints, however, as well as 

 positive support for the pursuit of these goals. 



U.S. SUPPORT OF IAEA 



U.S. officials worked hard to achieve the establishment of the 

 International Atomic Energy Agency and, initiall}", to endow it with 

 real powers. Despite the limited goals finally agreed upon for it, the 

 ofl^icial U.S. position heralding it was optimistic. Secretary of State 

 John Foster Dulles assured the wSenate Foreign Relations Committee 

 that the United States had achieved its diplomatic objective and 

 gained the widest possible international support for the new agency, 

 which would (among other things) provide a forum for the exchange 

 of information about nuclear energy discoveries, provide an effective 

 system of safeguards, enhance nuclear health and safet}^ strengthen 

 control of nuclear weapons, reduce pressure for proliferation, and im- 

 prove the climate of international relations. At the same time, Secre- 

 tarA^ Dulles, promised that the Agency would not be a "giveaway 

 organization" for U.wS. atomic secrets or nuclear fuel materials, and 

 that U.S. assistance to and through the Agency would not constitute 

 a subsidy to commercial nuclear power in Europe. 



When the Congress authorized U.S. participation in the IAEA, the 

 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had had almost 3 years of experi- 

 ence with bilateral agreements to foster the civil use of nuclear energj'. 

 These agreements involved assistance to some 40 countries ; most were 

 for nuclear research, a few for nuclear power. The State Department 

 at first advocated channeling such assistance through the IAEA as a 

 step toward achieving international agreement on common standards 

 for safeguards and gaining acceptance of inspection — in the belief that 

 nations would more readily accede to supervision by inspectors from 

 an international agency in which they participated than b}' those of 

 another nation. However, the insistence of AEC Chairman Lewis 

 Strauss that the United States should not abandon its bilateral agree- 

 ments deprived the new agency of an important source of strength. 



■'' Thesp as«nrancps wprp rot rmhorlipcl in the tpxt of the treaty itself. "Non-n'iclear-wrppons strtps soii.?ht 

 guarantppes that renunciation of nuclear arms would not placp ihem at a permanent military disadvantage 

 and make them vulnerable to nuclear intimidation. But, it was argued, the .security in+erests of the various 

 states, and proups of states, were not identical; an effort to frame provisions within the treaty that would 

 meet this diversity of requirements — for xmforeseeable future contingencies — would create inordinate 

 complexities. To resolve the issue, the T'nited States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom sub- 

 mitted ... a trinartite proposal that security assurnncps takp the form of a U.N. Security Council resolution, 

 supported by declarations of the three powers. [The declarations were duly made and the resolution was 

 passed, with France abstaining.] The resolution, noting the security concerns of states wishing to subscribe 

 to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would recognize that nuclear aggression, or the threat of nuclear aggression, 

 created a situation requiring immediate action by the Security Council, especially its permanent members." 

 V.P-. AiTns Control and Disarmament Ageiii v. Arms Control and Disarmament Arreements: Texts and 

 History of Neijotiations. Washington, D.C., U.S. Govt. Print. OfT., February 1975, p. 83. 



