1537 



On the whole, tlie Cong:ress has shown awareness of both the dangers 

 and the constructive potential of nuclear energy. However, it might 

 have been appropriate — ^and still might be — for the Congress to 

 demand more vigorous efforts on the part of the executive branch to 

 resolve longstanding problems of control in view of their vital bearing 

 on national and international security. 



Outcome 



The Atoms for Peace initiative seems certain to be judged among 

 history's significant instances of the diplomatic response to a new 

 science and technology. This initiative set forces in motion which have 

 already changed the world. Propelled by some of those forces — the 

 move to meet a growing shortfall in tlie world's oil supply through 

 nuclear energy production; continued trends toward the proliferation 

 of nuclear weapons and the potential for producing them — ^the future 

 course of civil nuclear power is approaching a point of no return. 



To epitomize all that Atoms for Peace set in motion is to oversim- 

 plify. Yet oversimplification may be necessary to highlight certain 

 urgent realities and keep them from being obscured by a welter of 

 detail. The two essential realities illuminated and acted upon by Atoms 

 for Peace are (1) the growing potentialities of nuclear energy to help 

 fill urgent world energy needs and, (2) the concomitant growing po- 

 tential threat to the world's safety through the increase of national 

 capabilities to make nuclear weapons, the potential risk of theft of 

 nuclear materials by subnational groups, and possible insults to the 

 global environment from escaped radiation. Constructive steps taken 

 to meet the energy needs have not yet caught up with it but are on 

 the way: the consensus in 1977 is that much of the world's electricity 

 supply' by the year 2000 can be provided by nuclear power if places 

 can be found for nuclear power station sites and the fears of environ- 

 mentalists can be allayed. 



The outlook with respect to proliferation remains ominous. As 

 Dr. Donnelly points out, European experience with international safe- 

 guards offers a working demonstration of inspection for future arms 

 control and disarmament."'*' On the other hand, what many observers 

 have characterized as the disappointing record of the May 1975 NPT 

 Review Conference in Geneva reinforces doubts as to whether the 

 momentum of progress toward an effective universal system of con- 

 trols is equal to the overwhelming importance of the goal.'^ 



Assessment 



vSome of the more pertinent observations of the 1972 study not 

 already cited are listed below, with page number: 



— Safeguards systems do not extend to physical protection 

 against theft or diversion, but only to detection of it. Assuring 

 the physical security of nuclear materials is a separate respon- 

 sibility of the possessing nation. (Vol. I, ]). 140) 



30 IIM.. p. 28.'). 



31 So». for rxamplf : (1) Tlip n>r>ort of flip Pro'^iflpnt of tlie Conferoncp, Swpdi=h TTnrior Spprntary of State 

 Tnia Thoi-sson, as inserted by Senator Edward Kennedy in the Congressional Record for July 30, 1975, p. 

 Sl44*)2- "Wl^.at vas a failure was not tliP conferenee. but the way in which the superpowers proved them- 

 spIvps unable to show the world not only their genuine will but also their capacity for disarmament. They 

 did notmakeacontributionof slrenKtheningtheNPTreginie." (2) Letterfrom Colgate University Professor 

 of Peace Studies Alan Geyer to Senator Hnliert H. Humphrey as inserted by the latter in the Congrrssinnal 

 Tlrcord for Jnup 3, 197.5. p. S93S3: ". . . it is painfully clear that the ioint United States-Soviet line here (in 

 Ceneva, May 10, li)7.'i] is to downgrade the conference and to stonewall any pressures to reverse their own 

 mutual escalation of the nuclear arms race." (3) Arms control and disarmament specialist Thomas A. 

 HalstPd's "Rpport from Geneva" in .4r)».<: Control Todnri, June 1975. p. 1-3 ". . . the Gonfereni-e undpr- 

 scored the fact that for the most part the Treaty has been an effective instrument for facilitating access to 

 the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Where the Treaty— and the R^'view Conference— continue to fall short 

 remains in the harder questions of security. . . ." 



