1544 



To what extent should U.S. technical assistance be limited to installation and 

 operation of nuclear powerplants, with assistance for other parts of the nuclear 

 power cycle to be avoided or withheld? 



To what extent should the United States unilaterally proceed to reserve exports 

 of nuclear materials, products, information, and assistance to those nonweapons 

 nations that agree to place all of their nuclear materials and facilities under IAEA 

 safeguards? 



What should be the i)articipotion of the private U.S. nuclear industry in 

 negotiating and carrjing out bilateral arrangements — in particular, extension of 

 present agreements on commercial u^e of nuclear power? 



How satisfactory is the present interworking of the Energy Research and 

 Development Agency (ERDA). the State Department, the Nuclear Regulatory 

 Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Administration in nego- 

 tiating and carrying out bilateral agreements? How consonant with national 

 foreign policy have past bilateral agreements been? 



What shou'd be the I\S. jjosition in offering technical aid and assistance to 

 Arab nations for nuclear power? 



To what extent should commercial exports of nuclear products, services, and 

 technology by private organizations be required to conform to U.S. foreign 

 policy, and how should this be done? 



What sht)uld be the role of Congress in review and appraisal of major ventures 

 in nuclear cooperation or in export of nuclear powerplants and associated goods 

 and services? 



THK INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 



What should be the U.S. diplomatic position on proposals to establish and 

 enforce international standards for the design, construction, and operation of 

 nuclear i)owerpl:ints and other facilities of the nuclear fuel cycle that may present 

 risks to the environment, to public health and safety, and to national and inter- 

 national security? 



To what extent would channeling U.S. assistance exclusively through the 

 IAEA strengthen that agency in general, and in its capabilities to provide effec- 

 tive safeguards for nuclear materials? 



What should be the U.S. position on establishing and enforcing international 

 regulations for transportation of fissionable and radioactive materials? 



What should be the U.S. position on extending international control of atomic 

 energy to include location, design, construction, and operation of facilities that 

 could cause transfrontier pollution in normal operations or in case of an accident? 



What would be the implications of U.S. participation in such arrangements 

 for domestic regulation of nuclear energy? What would be the expected roles of 

 the State Department, EIRDA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and ADC A? 



If the United States abandons its position as the sole supplier of enriched 

 uranium to the free world nuclear i)owerplants, would U.S. self-interest be served 

 better by establishing additional production facilities in the IAEA or by encourag- 

 ing national or regional ventures? 



To what extent would U.S. interests be served by having the IAEA locate, 

 build and operate facilities to reprocess spent fuel, recover plutonium and 

 depleted uranium, and store or manage long-term disposal of radioactive wastes? 



Considering questions about safeguards being raised by domestic critics of 

 nuclear power, what would be the comparative benefits and drawliacks of U.S. 

 diplomatic efforts to revive the Baruch-Lilienthal plan in part and make the 

 IAEA the sole proprietor of fuel reprocessing plants and all facilities for making 

 plutonium into nuclear fuel elements for use in domestic nuclear powerplants? 



The United States has offered voluntarily to place its domestic nuclear power 

 industry under IAEA safeguards once hold-out nations have ratified the NPT. 

 What would be the advantages and disadvantages of fulfilling that offer now 

 without waiting Icmger for nations such as France, India, Israel, and mainland 

 China to ratify? 



What would be the pros and cons of a U.S. policy to promote consolidation of 

 various regional nuclear organizations into the IAEA? 



THE IAEA AS A 



To what extent is the idea of tlie IAEA as a testln-d for arms control inhiliited 

 by tiie presence in tlie Agency of the Soviet Union V 



To what extent and in what ways eonld diplomacy protect IAEA operations 

 from ideological contests? Is this a realistic goal to postulate? 



