1778 



The most important point to emerge from the study is the necessity 

 of studying the long-range future diplomatic aspects of technology. It 

 is not evident that the kinds of expertise required for analyzing these 

 aspects as between high and low technology have been well considered. 

 However, they seem to differ substantially; moreover, within both 

 high and low technology there is a wide range of technical specialties. 



It would appear that some effort should be made by the Department 

 of State to represent its views on the diplomatic effects of government 

 policy toward both low and high technology, in both the short- and 

 long-range future. For low technology, the main concern would prob- 

 ably be with the long-range future inasmuch as only small incremental 

 changes are likely to result from short-term technological innovations 

 in the massive industries characteristic of this category. 



It is important also that the Department of State continuously 

 relate emerging or foreseen innovations of high technology to diplo- 

 macy, and represent the interests of the Department in Government 

 plans to advance or employ individual items of high technology. This 

 requirement implies that the Department become aware at an early 

 point in the usually protracted evolution of an item of high technology 

 as to its potential diplomatic significance, that the technology be 

 understood, that the possible directions of its development be fore- 

 seen, and that all of these be examined as they relate to U.S. foreign 

 policy objectives. 



World War II signaled the emergence of high technology as a potent 

 factor of diplomacy. In point of fact, its potency may have exceeded 

 the capacity of diplomacy to cope with it. As Secretary of State, 

 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger could well ponder the significance of his 1957 

 statement that "if recourse to force has in fact become impossible, 

 diplomacy too may lose its efficacy." *^^ The great variety and power 

 of electronic-guided, nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles and all the rest 

 of the panoply of modern arms puts an intolerable cost on obduracy. 



However, there are many less threatening offshoots of the high 

 technology of modern deterrent weapons: satellites have been found 

 capable of performing such peaceful chores as weather studies and 

 forecasting, aids to navigation, international communications, and 

 many kinds of surveys of the earth's surface. Each time some new 

 application becomes practicable the need arises for international 

 negotiation toward agreement as to what rules shall govern it. At 

 the same time, the nation achieving this first new use wins a degree 

 of prestige beneficial in the international marketplace of diplomacy; 

 in one sense, technological achievement may have become a surrogate 

 for military strength. During World War II Stalin is reported to have 

 asked concerning the Pope: "How many divisions does he have?" 

 Today the question might be: "How many different kinds of working 

 satellites has he placed in orbit?" Or, from Saudi Arabia, the question 

 might be: "How many barrels of oil can he export?" 



Achievements in high technology, while spectacular, tend to prod 

 other nations into feats of their own to equal or surpass the first 

 achievement. If the rewards are great, so will be the effort. Hence 

 leadership in high technology is a transient as Well as costly achieve- 

 ment. At best, the exploitation of its diplomatic rewards needs to be 

 planned well in advance and exploited promptly and with vigor when 



«' Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1325. 



