1575 



the sense of Congress that any action at that time to vest control of deep ocean 

 resources in an international body was hasty and ill advised . . . .^^ 



In hearings before several congressional committees, witnesses 

 favoring the principle of the Malta Proposal cited as among its 

 advantages the following: 



. . . regulation of the depletion of mineral resources, avoidance of an anarchic 

 rush to claim and exploit subsea resources, reduced danger of marine pollu- 

 tion . . ., reduced threat of a military race to exploit strategic advantages of 

 submarine weapons placement, provision of an independent income for the United 

 Nations, and a general strengthening and maturity in the U.N. itself, through the 

 experience of administering the vast area of the ocean floor." 



Objections to any U.N. action "stemmed primarily from fears that 

 the United States might be giving away some valuable assets and 

 rights the extent of which were not yet known". The qualifications of 

 the United Nations to accept the responsibihty were questioned. 

 Scientific exploration might be hampered by a premature definition of 

 political jurisdiction. National security interests might be compro- 

 mised. 



An executive branch proposal, August 3, 1970, became the focus of 

 a series of hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 

 Subcomnriittee on Ooean Space chaired by S3nator Chiiborne Pell. 

 Hearings on the proposal were also held by the Senate Committee on 

 Commerce, through its Special Study on United Nations Suboceanic 

 Lands Policy, chaired by Senator Ernest F. Rollings, and before a 

 Special Subcommittee on Outer Continental Shelf, chaired by Senator 

 Lee Metcalf. These sought answers to such questions as: 

 — What were the limits of the Continental Shelf? 

 — Should the limit be geological or legal? 



— Should it be based on considerations of equity, security, or 

 economic advantage? 



— How much did the United States stand to lose by the creation 

 of an international regime? 



— Was a new Law of the Sea Conference necessary? 

 — Should the States have a narrow or wide Continental Shelf? 

 — For areas beyond the Continental Shelf, what sort of an 

 international regime would be best? 



— What kind of international machiner}^ should be established? 



— How did all these aspects affect the economy and national 



security of the United States? 



The hearings made evident that two differing sets of policies were 



taking shape, one favoring substantial transfer of jurisdiction bej^ond 



a narrow Continental Shelf to an international body and the other 



urging extension of the Continental Shelf to the limit of exploitability. 



Outcome 



The case was unresolved by the time the Doimiani report went to 

 press. In fact, it continues unresolved in mid-1977, 6 years thereafter. 

 As an interim measure, a policy was proposed by the LTnited StatCvS 

 to the United Nations that "all nations join the United States to in- 

 sure that all permits for exploration and exploitation of the seabed 

 beyond the 200-meter limit be issued subject to an international au- 

 thbritv".'^ 



sii Ibid., p. 4'.(i». 

 " Ibid., p. .5(K). 

 « Ibid., p. 523. 



