1576 



Writing in 1971, Doumani concluded his study with the observation 

 that evohition of TJ.S. seabed policy "had been relatively slow". 



I'ndoubtedly the marine scientists and technologists would have preferred a 

 brisker pace than the diplomats were jirepared to take. For its part, the Congres 

 was ready to move faster than was the Department of State, although in wha 

 direction is still not evident.^* 



■ss 

 t 



Assessment 



The United States and the other interested countries of the world 

 have long had the opportiniity to resolve the question of who owns 

 the seabed before the beginning of a rush of entrepreneurs to exploit 

 the seabed mineral wealth, using technology certain to be perfected 

 sooner or later. The problem is not a technological one, although it is 

 cieated by technology and without the prospect of a technological 

 opportunity the problem would be a tiivial one. Only when the 

 technology is perfected to enable profitable exploitation of seabed 

 resources will the problem require urgent solution. 



The advantage of advance resolution of the problem is evident. 

 One can imagine the chaos of an international-gold rush into a territory 

 without law or property rights. The prospect of anarchy in a difficult 

 and perilous environment, with many claimants and costly equipment, 

 is disturbing to contemplate. For the United States to assert a policy 

 of "right of capture," based on this country's technological superi- 

 ority, affords no answer if the right should be challenged by another 

 nation using officially sanctioned force based on territorial claims. 

 Either the seas will be apportioned among national sovereignties, 

 perhaps by force, or some device for shared sovereignty in the hands 

 of a jointly established regidatory body must be created to regulate 

 the international commons. One way or the other, an agreed decision 

 must be made among nations as to jurisdiction over every part of the 

 ocean floor. Sovereignty, like nature, abhors a vacuum. 



In 1971 the U.S. Department of State had not formulated any 

 clear policy on how to resolve the dilemma. The Congress was divided 

 between a national and an international solution. There was un- 

 certainty over the competence and even the political stability of the 

 United Nations. The problem of extent of seaward boundaries re- 

 mained unresolved. There were emerging differences in goals between 

 the developed and the developing nations. And uncertainty over the 

 timing of technological advance permitted the problem to linger in 

 controversy until technology itself would eventually compel a crash 

 solution under crisis conditions. It is interesting to note that in this 

 case the essential facts of the situation are not in question; the case 

 is political and diplomatic rather than technological, even though it is 

 technology that makes it important. 



Author's Reassessment 



The study defined the legal and phj'sical boundaries of the seabed 

 and presented an inventory of its resources. The value of these re- 

 sources was then related to economics and the present and future 

 technological capabilities for exploring and exploiting them. The 

 study discussed potential technological breakthroughs, particularly 

 in the areas of offshore oil and hard minerals on the ocean floor. 



95 Ibid., p. 524. 



