1585 



subcommittee on SALT, might be appropriate. The creation of the Jackson siiVv 

 committee gave evidence of congressional interest, involvement, and authority. 

 Direct congressional involvement would seem especially desirable in view of 

 the complex, significant, and long-term nature of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial 

 Commission deliberations. Such involvement on a continuing basis could facilitate 

 effective treatment of issues concerning statutory authoritj', such as most- 

 favored-nation agreements, and in general those in which congressional interest 

 is high, for example, (^x])ort-iini)ort credits. (Ilnrdt-Holliday Ileport, i)p. (lOo-OOli) 



Outcome 



The legislative consequences that flo\ved from the U.S.-U.S.S.R. 

 trade agreements are summarized by the authors in mid-1977 as fol- 

 lows: Congress passed tlie Trade Act of 197-1: (Public Law 9;^-618) and 

 the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-646) 

 at the close of the 93d Congress. The Jackson- Vanik Amendment to the 

 Trade Act conditioned the extension of MFX and U.S. Government 

 credits to the Soviet Union on liberalization of Soviet emigration pol- 

 icy. The Export-Import Bank Amendments placed several special 

 restrictions on Eximbank financing of LLS.-Soviet trade. L^.S. export 

 control policy toward the Soviet Union has been influenced l)y two 

 amendments to the Export Administration Act — the Export Admin- 

 istration Amendments of 1974 (Public Law 93-500), enacted on Octo- 

 ber 29, 1974, and the Export Administration Amendments of 1977 

 (Public Law 95-52), enacted on June 22, 1977. The former Act clari- 

 fied and strengthened somewhat the authority of the Secretary of 

 Defense to review applications for exports of types and categories of 

 goods or technology which he considers to have potential military 

 applications. The latter Act changed the basis for determining which 

 countries should be subject to national security export controls. It 

 .stipulates that U.S. export control policy toward individual countries 

 is not to be determined exclusively on the basis of the country's Com- 

 munist or non-Conununist status, but by its general relationship with 



the United States. 



Assessment 



The Hardt-Holliday study concludes that: "The policies followed 

 by the United States and the Soviet Union will greatly influence the 

 probabilities of alternative outcomes." More specifically, adoption 

 by the Soviets of a consumer-oriented policy wx)uld divert lesources 

 and policy emphasis from a military buildup. On the U.S. side, the 

 Soviet policy of grain purchases would encom-age extension of the 

 interdependent relationship between the two superpowers into other 

 economic linkages. Inasmuch as Soviet policy objectives are "especially 

 crucial to such a projection," certainty is lacking as to which of dift'erent 

 alternate courses — or what compromise among them — the Soviet 

 leadershij) will adopt. (]). 600) 



As the report observed: 



The changes that have already been made seem likely to strengthen trade ties 

 between the United States and the Soviet Union, but many obstacles to com- 

 pletely normalized economic relations remain. The long-run growth of Soviet- 

 American economic relations will depend in large part on the continuation of the 

 liberalization process, (p. 593) 



A matrix might be drawm up of possible outcomes and their effects, 



for the United States and the Soviet Union, of; (a) exports from the 



•United States to the Soviet Union; (b) exports from the U.S.S.R. to 



the United States; (c) technology transfers from the United States to 



the Soviets; (d) economic changes in the United States as a conse- 



