1530 



Soviet Union had assembled its own stockpile of Hiroshima-type 

 atom bombs and had successfully tested a hydrogen bomb. Meanwhile, 

 several "People's Republics" had been established in Eastern Europe 

 and China, South Korea had been invaded, attempts to form a 

 European Defense Community had not worked out, and international 

 disarmament negotiations were deadlocked. ^^ Moreover, the Kremlin 

 had pressed a vigorous and considerably successful diplomatic and 

 propaganda offensive to persuade the world that nuclear weapons were 

 not decisive, that they nevertheless were especially horrible and 

 should be banned, and that the U.S.S.R. was prepared to take the 

 lead in developing nonmilitary applications of atomic energy. ^^ The 

 principal U.S. reaction to the frustrations of this period of strategic 

 setbacks and declining nuclear advantage was to threaten massive 

 retaliation with nuclear weapons against Communist aggression. 



Another reactive policy was the "Atoms for Peace" proposal. "With- 

 in the United Nations, the response . . . was instantaneous and favor- 

 able. The speech was scored as a victory for the United States in 

 international affairs by undercutting a persuasive Communist propa- 

 ganda offensive. . . ." ^^ 



Historically, the proposal represented a unique and constructive 

 attempt to shift the emphasis in utilizing a significant new technology 

 away from its military potential and toward its peaceful applications: 



It signaled the start of U.S. diplomatic efforts to create an international atomic 

 energy agency; American encouragement to two European regional, multinational 

 agencies for nuclear energy; establishment of a network of bilateral agreements 

 between the United States and individual nations for technical assistance in 

 nuclear energy; and a treaty to establish international safeguards over nuclear 

 fuel materials. These diplomatic ventures sought to foster civil use of nuclear 

 energy abroad, ranging from applications of radioisotopes for research and for 

 diagnosis and treatment in medicine to the demonstration of nuclear power for the 

 generation of electricity. Underlying the publicized, idealistic purpose of sharing 

 U.S. nuclear science and technology were pragmatic, practical considerations of 

 advantages to the United States.22 



"o'- 



In the most consequential way, probably, of any of the 12 studies 

 in the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy series, this 

 case (together with the preceding one on the Baruch plan) raises 

 questions as to what diplomatic courses of action in fact are, in the 

 long run, most advantageous to the U.S. national interest in dealing 

 with a potent new technology. 



How the Case Developed 



The international activity most directly associated with atoms for 

 peace is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It was 

 established July 29, 1957, as an international organization within the 

 framework of the United Nations. It continues to report annually to 

 the U.N. General Assembl}^ and, on occasion, to the Security Council 

 and the Economic and Social Council. 



i« Ibid., p. 150. 



20 Henry A. Kissinger, Nudiar Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York, published for the Council on 

 Foreign Relations by Harper & Bros., 1957: pp. 363-364. 



21 Donnelly, op. cit., pp. 151-152. 



22 Ibid, p. 150. 



