1570 



There is a tendency for local leadership to concentrate on the 

 piins and io;nore tlie risks. However, unless gains are balanced 

 a2;ainst risks, the long-range consequences — both regional and 

 diplomatic — may be unfavorable. 



— Political acceptability of a multination regional development 

 proje(;t requires that benefits be evident to all participants, and 

 that costs and benefits to each nation be in reasonable balance. 



A large midtination project can attract contributions from many 

 nations outside the region; these can aggregate to an impressive 

 total investment even though no one contribution is much of a 

 burden to the donor. 



— An important benefit of a large project in a developing region 

 is the necessarv education and training of local participants, and 

 tlie experience gained in lo(;al leadership and planning. 



— The subject of regional application of technology for social 

 purposes contains many of the elements that make the interaction 

 of science and technology with diplomacy important politically. In 

 addition to the potential contributions of the subject to diplomatic 

 goals, it challenges the ability of the executive and legislative 

 branches to exploit opportunities that may require years of 

 evolution. 



— When tlie Pi-esident presents the Congress with a specific 

 regional program, with the costs and benefits adequately defined, 

 the Congress tends to respond favorably and promptly. 



— The combining of U.S. interests in international regional 

 development as an approach to national security and as an ap- 

 proach to economic advancement tends to detract from the effec- 

 tiveness of such development for either purpose. A "low profile" 

 of external supporting nations tends to yield most fruitful results. 



— For a variety of reasons attention to international regional 

 development b}' the Congress has diminished. Domestic economic 

 concerns have attracted attention away from foreign develop- 

 ment. Tensions in the Middle East have replaced Southeast Asian 

 troubles as the focus of effort in conflict reduction. Confidence in 

 the practical utility of social science for pubhc policy has been 

 shaken. Finally, there is a tendency for the Congress to give 

 principal attention to short-term problems, at the expense of 

 longer-range considerations — especially when the opportunities of 

 diplomatic gain ofl'ered b}' the latter are at a low confidence level. 



— To conclude with a quotation from the study itself: "It is 

 slieer speculation that a U.S. -encouraged regional development 

 of the Lower Mekong Basin in 1954 might have provided a focus 

 for peaceful economic progress, served as an educational process, 

 and established a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted 

 legion. However, the question seems legitimate as to whether 

 the consequences of a slowly and deliberately encouraged regional 

 development — region by region — in lagging parts of the world 

 might serve U.S. foreign policy objectives in the long run." *^ 



Some Ilhistrafive Qiiestio7is 



What U.S. institution might best take the lead in planning for th^ 

 application of regional development principles to advance U.S. diplo- 

 matic objectives? 



Might the role of U.N. agencies be usefully expanded for this 

 purpose? 



8S Huddle, The Mekomi Project vnl. I, p. 43! 



