1543 



— Sustaining U.S. international leadership in nuclear tech- 

 nology in the 1970s. 



— Reducing United States, European, and Japanese depend- 

 ence upon imported oil. 



— Controlling the possibilities for nuclear proliferation. 

 — Demonstrating the practicability of international inspection 

 for arms control. 



— Improving the U.S. position in world trade. 

 — Assessing the implications of domestic opposition to nuclear 

 energy upon U.S. diplomacy. 



— Maintaining a competitive position for the United States in 

 the world market for nuclear goods and services. 



— Cooperating in international efforts to control environmental 

 effects of nuclear power. 



— Developing international safety and environmental protec- 

 tion standards for nuclear powerplants. 



— Protecting the U.S. position in uranium enrichment and 

 fuel reprocessing. 



— Establishing criteria for export of U.S. nuclear products and 

 technology. 



— Establishing sanctions for violation of non-proliferation 

 commitments. 



— Establishing multinational or international organizations to 

 enrich uranium and to store spent fuel. 

 Finally, the study identified two main lines of thought that the Con- 

 gress might wish to pursue: the use of nuclear technology in U.S. 

 diplomacy; and the use of diplomacy to advance nuclear technology. 

 While separate, these lines do interact and that interaction should be 

 systematically taken into account. The study also indicated a close 

 interaction of U.S. domestic and foreign interests in commercial nu- 

 clear power, which suggests that if recent efforts by Mr. Nader, the 

 Union of Concerned Scientists, and others, to persuade the Congress 

 to enact a moratorium on nuclear power reach the stage of legislation, 

 the implications of such an act upon U.S. diplomacy would require 

 analysis. 



Further, the study sought to highlight present and coming issues of 

 international safeguards for nuclear power. To strengthen interna- 

 tional safeguards would necessitate treaty changes, with attendant 

 Senate advice and consent; both Houses would be involved with legis- 

 lation to authorize and fund new or 'expanded U.S. agency activities 

 to this end. 



Some Illustrative Questions 



Cases One and Two suggest an extensive catalog of questions which 

 appear to warrant congressional concern. Because of the special ur- 

 geny of the problems of nuclear energy utilization and control, they 

 are given in some detail. 



CHANNELING OF U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN NUCLEAR POWER 



In the light of current concern over risks of theft of nuclear materials, should 

 the United States seek renegotiation of the NPT to deemphasize this commitment 

 and deliberately slow down technical assistance for nuclear power? 



If U.S. technical assistance should continue, would U.S. interests be best served 

 by channeling this assistance through bilateral agreements with recipient countries, 

 by supplying it through the IAEA? Conversely, which approach would seem most 

 favored by the recipient nations? 



