1592 



that Congress would repeal the Trade Act restrictions of MFX and 

 ofovernment credits for non-market economy countries. Secretary 

 Vance described U.S. -Soviet trade as "an important underpinninor of 

 our relationship." ^"^^ Secretary Vance made his comments after 

 repeated expressions by Soviet officials of dissatisfaction with the 

 status quo in U.S.-Soviet trade. Soviet representatives officially con- 

 ve3-ed tlieir dissatisfaction to the Carter administration in a June 

 1977 meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission,^"^'' The 

 Soviet delegation informed U.S. representatives that imports from 

 the United States would drop sharply in 1977 and 1978 as a result of 

 the continuing trade and credit restrictions. A reduction of U.S. ex- 

 ports to the Soviet Union had been anticipated because of a reduced 

 Soviet need for U.S. grain, Soviet hard currency payments problems, 

 and the end of Soviet orders for several large industrial projects which 

 had made extensive use of U.S. machinery and equipment. However, 

 Soviet officials have asserted that they would shift future import 

 orders from U.S. firms to other Western firms if the U.S. restrictions 

 remain. 



Some Illustrative Questions 



Should the United States grant trade benefits to governments 

 which pursue hostile foreign policies and repressive domestic policies? 



Will increased U.S. trade with Communist countries help to bring 

 favorable change in their policies? 



Will exports of U.S. technology, often assisted by low-cost Govern- 

 ment credits, assist the economic and military development of Com- 

 munist countries? 



Will the United States receive significant economic benefits from 

 East-West trade? 



Should the United States make exceptions to its general long-run 

 policy of advocating unrestricted international trade? 



Is there a danger that the United States might become dependent 

 on Communist countries for important raw material supplies? 



What effects are increased economic exchanges, especially in tech- 

 nology-intensive products, likely to have on U.S. foreign policy goals 

 and on U.S. national security? 



What technological contributions will U.S.-Soviet commercial 

 exchanges make to American industry? 



What risks will these exchanges pose to specific U.S. industries 

 and industrial corporations? 



Does the Soviet leadership perceive as yet the need for serious 

 changes in internal planning and management to rationalize produc- 

 tion to satisfy market needs? At what point will the leadership see 

 the cost of not changing as grea,ter than the cost of change? 



Does the sale of U.S. high technology products to the Soviet Union 

 encourage or discourage Soviet military preparedness? 



Do Soviet requirements for U.S. technology require longer periods 

 of commitment than w^as the case in the past? 



Does the trade agreement represent a part of a new pattern of 

 relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States? 



io.-!b Wttshliigton I'ost. .Tune 17. 1977. p. A22. 



103c 'x-he U.S.-Soviet Commercial Commission wa.s established in 1972 to find ways to 

 facilitate and promote commercial ties between the two countries. The June 1977 meeting 

 was the first of the Carter Administration. See Washington Post, June 11, 1977, p. D8. 



