1584 



called for a considerable mobilization of U.S. talent. "In order to link 

 the broadest security and diplomatic interests with the commercial 

 arrangements, the involvement of high-level polic3rmakers is es- 

 sential." Also indispensable are "specialists on the Soviet Union, 

 foreign trade specialists, and private businessmen" to provide technical 

 advice. In short: 



The long-term process of negotiation, its specialized character, and the broad 

 national interests inherent in U.S. -Soviet relations require a permanent working 

 blend of experienced people with the following characteristics : 



a. Top politicians from both executive and legislative branches, authorized 

 to speak for the White House and Congress as a whole ; 



b. Government trade specialists from the Departments of Commerce, 

 Treasury, State, and other agencies ; 



c. Specialists on Soviet political-economic affairs from governmental or 

 academic positions; and 



(1. Repivseiitatives of private business and hankiuR. (p. (')05) 



Bole oj Congress 



The Hardt-Holliday report pointed out that, "Congress neces- 

 sarily will be involved in certain aspects of U.S.-Soviet economic re- 

 lations in the future." For example, "Congressional approval is re- 

 quired for extension of MFN treatment to the Soviet Union". (]). 5:^9) 

 Congressional action would also be rcciuired to e.\|)an(l the credit 

 resources of the Plxpoi-t-Iinpoi-t liank (p. 5S6) and would be desirable 

 to monitor the various easements in legulation by the administration 

 to facilitate the enlarging ])attern of U.S.-Soviet trade. 



Although seveial reports (|). 5.'^<S) urged the necessity of a "major 

 and direct role of (/ongiess in (Soviet) trade negotiations," no effort 

 was made to involve the Congress in the trade discussions with the 

 Soviets and no enabling legislation was enacted to facilitate the 

 trade agreement. Only after the fact was the Congress asked to extend 

 MFN status to the U.S.S.R. (see es|)ecially |)p. 576-587). 



It appears that a considerably expanded congressional role will be 

 necessary in the future to enable the exercise of constitutional re- 

 sponsibilities of the legislative branch in the conduct of U.S.-Soviet 

 commercial relations. In addition to the actions indicated above, the 

 Congress will presumably be asked for other pieces of implementing 

 legislation, including appropriations; it will have the continuing re- 

 sponsibility for legislative oversight; it will be continuously concerned 

 with the impact on U.S. programs, interests, and economic conditions 

 of trade with the Soviets (grain transactions being an example of this 

 concern) ; and it will be concerned with the broader impact of the 

 U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade and technology transactions and agreements on 

 U.S. foreign policy in general. 



Accordingly, the Hardt-Holliday report suggested that, "it would 

 be particularly beneficial to include Members of Congress in the 

 commercial negotiations"; and that "very careful official and public 

 scrutiny of each step in the progress of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Com- 

 mercial Commission discussions would appear to be in order for both 

 the executive and legislative branches." 



Congressional involvement [said the report] would permit a broader representa- 

 tion of U.S. public opinion and facilitate passage of legislative measures needed 

 to improve U.S.-Soviet commercial relations. Without continuous involvement 

 of the Congress and private interests, it could be difficult to have an informed 

 debate on important issues. The establishment of a special congressional committee 

 or subcommittee to deal with East- West trade, roughly paralleling the Jackson 



