1901 



Moreover, the limited exposure that Members of Congress can allow 

 themselves in overseas travel, while undoubtedly useful in establishing 

 contacts and dialogues with U.S. representatives in foreign countries, 

 has certain dangers as well. The information thus secured tends to be 

 restricted in scope, and the limits of time for in-depth interviews and 

 consultations subject such investigations to bias and superficiality 

 that only longer and broader exposure of information sources in the 

 country could balance out and correct. 



Several legislative options are available to strengthen congressional 

 information-gathering pertinent to foreign relations (in addition to 

 those discussed below under the heading "Congressional Oversight 

 of Foreign Policy Programs"). One possibility is to arrange a more 

 extensive preliminary preparation for overseas investigations. Assign- 

 ments to the General Accounting Office and Congressional Research 

 Service could be used more systematically, in addition to assignments 

 of committee staff, to assemble background data for staff analysis. 

 These two services could be utilized for overseas data collection at 

 U.S. Embassies and other foreign installations for use by congressional 

 committees, members, and staffs. Additionally, CRS could make 

 greater use in Washington of its mandate under the Legislative 

 Reorganization Act of 1970: ". . . when so authorized by a 

 committee and acting as the agent of that committee, to request of 

 any department or agency of the United States the production of 

 of such books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and 

 documents as the Service considers necessary. ..." 



Another possibility is the establishment of an intern or staff exchange 

 program between the Congress and the Department of State. Familiar- 

 ity with the information structure possessed by the Department (and 

 perhaps the various mission agencies as well) could be increased by 

 such a two-way exchange. This arrangement would help to obviate the 

 longstanding difficulty facing the Congress in asking the right ques- 

 tions. The answers tend to be either shallow and unresponsive or 

 excessively voluminous and unwieldy. Familiarity with the sj^stem 

 could help to sharpen the questions and enable the Congress to insist 

 on pertinent fact. 



IN-HOUSE ANALYSIS CAPABILITY 



Even the best information resources are of relatively little use if 

 wheat cannot be sifted from the chaff. The Department of State 

 wrestles perennially with this problem, and an improved flow of 

 information to the Congress would raise the problem in a new setting. 



The Murphy Commission proposed to solve this problem for the 

 executive branch by creating a number of institutional modifications 

 to structure the information. These included combining economic and 

 political offices in embassies, better two-way communication to define 

 and respond to needs from home, selection of ambassadors on the basis 

 of technical qualifications, and strengthening of intelligence and analy- 

 sis capabilities of the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, 

 and Agriculture, and the Council of Economic Advisers. (Why not 

 also Interior, Labor, HEW, ERDA, and the National Science 

 Foundation?) 



The congressional need for analysis of information relating to U.S. 

 foreign policy is met in part by relevant committee staffs and three 



