1865 



The process of applying technological means to social and economic objectives 

 can be made coherent and understandable to those who expect to enjoy the 

 benefits."^ 



Further study and planning might turn up additional advantages in 

 terms of the realignment of nations in regional multinational group- 

 ings. For example : What would be the consequences for U.S. security 

 of a "world system of economically and technologically better balanced 

 regions?" Might such a system reduce tensions among or between 

 nations in such regions, between developing and developed nations, or 

 even between the great superpowers? How might the People's Republic 

 of China react to such an initiative? And finally, the study proposes 

 the consideration of a possibility for the restructuring of the U.N. 

 General Assembly: "Might regional voting in that body and associated 

 U.N. agencies provide a better or more representative arrangement 

 than the present, admittedly awkward system of one-country-one- 

 vote?" 5*8 



The concluding paragraph of the study warrants repeating at this 

 point: 



The impUcation of the Hanna observation, and other like writings, is that the 

 cost-effectiveness of regional development projects is not fully measurable in 

 economic terms alone. If an economically marginal project advances a diplomatic 

 goal — stabilizes a region, inspires international cooperation, ameliorates tensions, 

 provides a peaceful alternative to insurgency, offers an ideological bridge and 

 teaches different ethnic groups how to work together — it might well be more useful 

 than a project yielding high economic return but without these intangible benefits. 

 There is, of course, no hard evidence that all these favorable outcomes are a likely 

 . . . outcome of a global policy of regionalism. However, the bare possibility — as 

 evidenced in what has been called "the Mekong Spirit" — that the concept might 

 serve as an instrument of long range diplomacy seems worth further examination 

 and putting to the test."' 



The signal advantage of coupling U.S. long-range planning for 

 diplomacy with large-scale multinational regional initiatives is that 

 actions can be taken incrementally and developed slowly. A sense of 

 growing hope and self-confidence can be engendered in the region. 

 Mistakes can be seen early and corrected. And the diplomatic process 

 of initiation can be systematically replaced by a cordial cooperative 

 relationship among workers at the technical level in direct contact 

 with the human beneficiaries dwelling in the region. Such constructive 

 people-to-people contacts may indeed be the epitome of the purpose 

 of long-range diplomatic planning. 



CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed 5^" 



From the earliest stirrings of international law and formal diplo- 

 macy the oceans possessed the character of an international commons. 

 Defining the territorial boundary that divided this commons from the 

 sovereign realms of nations and devising means by which the law of 

 nations could be extended to the international commons had promi- 

 nent place on the agenda of early international law. Relative success 

 attended these efforts until advancing technology showed the possi- 

 bility that first the continental shelves and later the deep oceans 

 themselves could b6 mined for oil, metals, and other valuable minerals. 



M' Huddle, The Mekong Project: OppoTtunUies and Problems of Regionalism, Vol. I, p. 431. 



54S ihid. 



5" Ibid., pp. 431-432. 



550 Doumani, Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed, A'ol. I, pp. 43')-524. 



