1525 



]:)Ossible — a consideration that was as much in tlio minds of t]io 

 Soviet leaders as it was a concern of the administration and 

 the Congress. Yet the American leadership realized, and stated 

 ])ublicly, that the secret could not be kept for long. Therefore, it 

 was necessary to move quickly and comprehensively to estab- 

 lish international controls. Paradoxically, the U.S. approach — 

 in particular, the fact that the United States repeatedly asserted 

 its intention of relinquishing atomic weapons but never reached 

 the point of defining the conditions and timing of what it would 

 consider acceptable controls — apj^ears to have underlined the 

 U.S.S.R.'s suspicion that it was the American purpose to retain 

 essential control while giving the appearance of vesting it in an 

 international body. 



— There was calculated ambiguity in the Soviet position. Gen- 

 uinely suspicious of the United States, the U.S.S.R. substituted 

 statements of principle for concrete plans while it continued its 

 own atomic weaponry i)rogram which was to prove much further 

 advanced than most American scientists and diplomats sus- 

 pected at the time. In retrospect, the fact of understandable — 

 and at least partly justified — Soviet suspicions may argue that 

 the United States should have adopted a more conciliatory, 

 patient, and persistent negotiating posture. 



— Certain features of the U.S. proposals which some considered 

 essential to an effective control system — notably those concern- 

 ing limitation of national sovereignty, inspection, and waiver 

 of veto in the Security Council in matters of punishment for 

 violations of a control agreement — were totally imacceptable 

 to the Soviet Union. The question arises as to whether these 

 points were in fact essential to a control plan and as to the extent 

 to which they prevented meaningful negotiation. A i)ossible 

 alternative approach in the U.S. poHcymaking process might 

 have been first to determine what among the basic technological 

 and political requirements of an effective control system each 

 side would accept, and then try to estabhsh some common ground 

 between the two positions. A willingness to proceed on this basis 

 might at least have emphasized good faith and signaled an under- 

 standing that each side had its special political problems to 

 resolve.'^ 



— There were conflicts in the relationships and respective roles 

 of the American scientists and diplomats. Although the diplomats 

 carried the action, with the scientists in a limited advisory role, 

 it was the technology of atomic energy which set the scope and 

 tone of the negotiations. Disagreements were couched in tech- 

 nological terms. Actually, they reflected political differences, but 

 the diplomats failed to deal with them accordingly. At the same 

 time, scientists who were in a position to influence policymakers in 

 the United States and in the UNAEC failed to recognize the 

 problems of feasibility of control in the context of emerging 

 post-war political relationshiDS. 



" On the other hand, it is of course possible to speculate that nothing could have induced the Sd viet leaders 

 to compromise on what they considered key issues, as long as (a) the U.S.S.R. lacked atomic weapons 

 and therefore remained in a weak bargaining position, and (b) the leadership believed it either certain or 

 strongly possible that the U.S.S.R. would soon develop its own atomic bomb. 



