1721 



Denied advance knowledge of the new weapon, the Department of 

 State was in no position to evolve its own diplomatic strategy. Even 

 had the knowledge been vouchsafed to its leaders, the technical skills 

 of the Department would scarcely have been equal to the task of 

 foretelling the directions and rate of change in military technology 

 that would result. And, indeed, even had they seen these clearly, and 

 planned well for the arms control negotiations to follow the war, it is 

 still doubtful that the Department, as constituted, could have led the 

 United States or other nations into a stable agreement for the control 

 of the new weapon. It would, it appears, have taken more effective and 

 purposeful governmental machinery for resolving global security prob- 

 lems of such high magnitude, charged Math sparing no effort and yield- 

 ing to no obstacles in working out step-by-step solutions, than then 

 existed — or than exists today. It can be argued that for lack of such 

 machinery and such resolve, (1) a crucial early initiative failed, (2) 

 no decisive action was taken to replace the failed initiative, and (3) a 

 pattern of escalation was established, and still prevails. 



CASE two: COMMERCCAL nuclear power in EUROPE 



The effort to bring the atomic technology under practical control 

 was renewed during President Eisenhower's first term of office. In 

 his Atoms for Peace address to the U.N. General Assembly, Decem- 

 ber 8, 1953, the President foresaw nuclear proliferation and its attend- 

 ant dangers. The alternative he proposed was an initiative to commit 

 increasing quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful, energy- 

 producing appUcations. The United States would lead the way. 



Success in this endeavor was mixed. The spread of peaceful nuclear 

 technology was undoubtedly speeded and some fissionable material 

 was diverted from weaponry. But an abundance of fissionable material 

 was reserved to trigger the ever-growing stockpiles of thermonuclear 

 (fusion) warheads. Meanwhile, the plutonium produced as a.byproduct 

 of fission power reactors grew from a nuisance to a real danger: it 

 could become a weapon in the hands of a nation with modest technical 

 capabilities, or conceivably even in the hands of a terrorist 

 organization. 



It is not evident whether the extent of safeguards necessary to 

 maintain control over byproduct plutonium would have been accept- 

 able as a concomitant of nuclear sharing. Yet the combination of 

 policies — each plausible in itself — to share the peaceful atom, en- 

 courage its exploitation by private enterprise, aid less-advanced 

 nations in its use, and introduce the theme of healthy competition into 

 the use of the technology lias produced a mixture of benefits and 

 hazards that seem likely to grow side by side. 



Again, it is not evident that more profound study of this diplomatic 

 initiative could have held down the costs or enhanced the benefits. 

 The momentum of Presidential policy might have been too strong for 

 intervention by any policy planning group. Nor can it be said that the 

 world would necessarily have been a safer place had the President not 

 taken the Atoms for Peace initiative. 



Nevertheless, it is at least possible that such study, backed by a 

 combined Presidential and congressional determination inspired by 

 recognition of the growing magnitude of the problem, could have led 

 at this second likely moment in history to effective international 



