1819 



The Issue oj Independence Versus Interdependence as a Theme in This 

 Study 



An examination of the ways in which the dimension of independence/ 

 interdependence fi^ires in the six cases and six issues presented in the 

 Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy study series — or any 

 of the other five dimensions considered in this part of the final 

 chapter — was not specifically anticipated when the series was originally 

 planned in 1969, but was decided upon after the 12 studies had been 

 completed. The common perspective which the authors of the latter 

 shared with the project directors was essentially limited at the 

 outset to the broad theme of interaction among science, technology, 

 and the formulation and conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The findings 

 which follow are a reflection, therefore, of the separate mquiries of 

 different authors. 



These findings support the widely held thesis that interdependence 

 of the world's nations and peoples is a growing reality, with a primary 

 link to technology. As the applications of technology spread, so does 

 the condition of interdependence. 



Some of the cases and issues are explicit on this theme; others are 

 illustrative by implication. 



CASE one: the baruch plan 



The symbolic significance of the atom bomb and its consequences 

 for interdependence have been noted. The mere existence of this 

 weapon in large numbers and with sophisticated delivery systems 

 deters opposing nuclear powers from major belligerency. This tech- 

 nological development has thus deprived war of its social function. 

 The function of war in the past has been to help intransigent adversary 

 states resolve otherwise intractable issues. Or, to put it another way, 

 war and the capability to wage it was a means of assigning a cost to 

 intransigence. Issues may still be intractable, and adversaries may 

 still be intransigent, but total war has lost its social function — 

 nuclear war, at any rate — because its virtually unthinkable cost is 

 grossly disproportionate to the value of the service it would perform. 

 In this sense, war — nuclear war — has priced itself out of the market. 



But there is a flaw in that generalization: it applies only to the 

 rational use (or rather, withholding from use) of nuclear weapons by 

 responsible powers who understand the consecjuences of massive 

 nuclear exchanges. Today all other nations are at the mercy of the 

 United States and the Soviet Union — but one must reach for rather 

 unlikely scenarios to conceive of rational use of nuclear weapons by 

 either country. Tomorrow all nations, including the United States 

 and the Soviet Union, may in fact be at the mercy of some reckless 

 possessor of atomic bombs — perhaps an unidentified aggressor at 

 whom it is impossible to strike back in time to affect the outcome. 



It may be yielding to fantasy to suppose that if the Baruch Plan 

 negotiations had led to a control agreement involving the gradual 

 elimination of nuclear weapons, the possibility of a new balance of 

 terror would have been forever precluded, and nations would at last 

 have got down to the serious business of eliminating war itself as a 

 means of resolving major international differences in the face of 

 intransigence. There seems little doubt, however, that success in the 



