1540 



issues involving nuclear energy: To what extent should U.S. 

 foreign policy and diplomacy continue to foster commercial use 

 of nuclear power abroad? Can such a policy help enough with 

 future U.S. technological leadership to be worth the effort, or 

 would the required financial and other resources be more profit- 

 ably dedicated to some other venture? Would the benefits for U.S. 

 technological leadership be more than offset by economic losses 

 through competition from other countries receiving U.S. tech- 

 nological assistance? Most important of all, are there any sig- 

 nificant risks and dangers from the standpoint of U.S. national 

 security in continued U.S. support of foreign nuclear power 

 development? (Vol. I, p. 286) 

 Diversity of outlook and experimental approach can lead to weak- 

 ness or vulnerability when the danger is either unclear or not imminent. 

 The potential for extreme danger in nuclear proliferation has been 

 clear enough to American diplomatic and congressional leaders from 

 the outset, but not the imminence of that danger. Reaction to this 

 threat has been slow in coming. 



Although man}^ voices compete in the formulation of U.S. foreign 

 policy, there is relatively free play for influential expression of the 

 views of strong individuals (as Secretary of State or Secretary of 

 Defense, for example) unchecked by sustained and sober analysis of the 

 technological miplications of any given proposal regarding nuclear 

 energ3^ There is, in short, no central governmental machinery for 

 technology assessment in the nuclear field comparable to the Office 

 of Technology Assessment with its mandate in other areas, Further- 

 more, OTA is a mechanism of the Congress. There would appear to 

 be a compelling need for centralized institutional machinery and 

 procedures in the executive branch to provide impartial, measured, 

 and long-rang-e assessments of all nuclear energy developments or 

 proposals (or needed initiatives) affecting U.S. national interests and 

 international security.^'^ It would follow that development of counter- 

 part oversight machinery, possibly involving in part an extension of 

 the OTA mandate, should be considered by the Congress. 

 Author's Reassessment 



Author Warren H. Donnelly comments retrospectively as follows: 

 Beginning with the explosion of the atom bomb over Hiroshima in 

 August 1945 U.S. diplomac}^ was doubly affected b}^ the discover}^ of 

 nuclear fission. The military use of atomic energy became a mainstay 

 of U.S. foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union. By the mid- 

 1950s the civil uses of nuclear power appeared promising enough for 

 U.S. diplomacy to back efforts to promote the peaceful use of nuclear 

 energy to create international and regional atomic organizations for 

 this purpose. With the late 1960s and early 1970s the imperatives of 

 nuclear weapons led to international treaties and agreements and to 

 the strategic arms limitations talks. During these years, U.S. diplo- 

 macy also assisted the domestic development of nuclear power by 

 helping to open markets for the infant U.S. nuclear industry and to 

 provide opportunities to demonstrate nuclear power abroad before 



^''^ Dr. DonneUy comments (July 1977) that executive branch machinery for policy and 

 management relating to civil uses of nuclear energy remains fragmented. The Department 

 of State negotiates agreements for cooperation but the Energy Research and Development 

 Adinlnstratlon (ERDA) administers the arrangements under them; the Nuclear Reguatory 

 Commission regulates safety and some environmental aspects of nuclear energy, as well as 

 exports of nuclear materials and equipment. ERDA regulates exports of some, but not all, 

 nuclear technology. ERDA Is also developing new or Improved nuclear technologies but Is 

 not supposed to promote them. The Environmental Protection Administration is expanding 

 its regulatory role for nuclear power, while the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Is 

 trying to promote development of proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycles. 



