1679 



agencies have operational responsibilities in the area of diplomacy, 

 but the State Department is responsible for coordinating their actions 

 in consonance with U.S. foreign pohcy. 



But how clearly is that responsibility defined, and how fully pro- 

 vided for in terms of competent staffs and appropriate authority? How 

 broadly and effectively is it exercised? To what extent does the State 

 Department in fact assume the focal role in this consequential area? To 

 what extent is the State Department in fact the locus of decisionmaking 

 and coordinated implementation of the widely varied activities in- 

 volving Science, Technologj^, and American Diplomac}^ exemplified 

 by the subjects of the preceding studies? Answers to these and related 

 questions were sought in this focal study of the series. 



Statement of the Issue 



The study puts it simply, perhaps understating the case: "... a 

 succession of Secretaries of State and their subordinates [have periodi- 

 cally asserted] the importance of science and technology for diplomacy. 

 The roster of problems, issues, and instances that can be collected from 

 such statements is impressive. But the effort to marshal the Depart- 

 ment's resources to deal with this array of business does not seem com- 

 mensurate with the demand.""^ 



The State Department, then, has not failed to recognize, and has at 

 least paid lip service to, its responsibilities for relating science and 

 technology to diplomacy — 



. . . The attempt was made, but circumstances and competing demands on 

 departmental resources stood in the way. Some specific projects and programs 

 did peter out, others never got off the ground. Thus the need for a scientific and 

 technological competence, spread throughout the Department of State, is great 

 and increasing; what appears to be required is not some vast shake-up but a 

 carefully managed, gradual, but steady growth in technical sophistication, a 

 heightened visibility of technological content of diplomacy throughout. This 

 appreciation should encompass both the positive and negative impacts of technol- 

 ogy on diplomacy, and be perceived in both the regional and functional bureaus. 

 There needs to be a deeper appreciation of the relationship between U.S. techno- 

 logical developments and the U.S. international posture, and of the potential 

 contributions to U.S. diplomacy for foreseeable future technological develop- 

 ments.2" 



The heart of science and technolog}*, the study further notes, is 

 invention and change. The problem is to make this process serve — 

 and in a subordinate sense, be served b}^ — the conduct of U.S. di- 

 plomacy. To do both requires increased creativeness and receptivity 

 to innovation. More specifically, "the rate of technological change 

 and its impacts on the diplomatic environment call for a strengthened 

 ability of the functional bureaus to perceive and interpret these 

 changes and impacts, around the world, and for an increased alertness 

 to the predictive power of technology analysis and forecasting." ^'^ 



But this is more easily said than done. The problem is elusive. 

 Prof. Edgar S. Robinson points out that it is rooted in a psychological 

 attitude that is widespread in America, among the general public 

 as well as among State Department officialdom: 



. . . while the public is quite aware of technology's omnipresence, it does not 

 view technology as the progenitor of insoluble problems. Even as intractable a 

 menace as thermonuclear weapons appears to have begotten the boon of detente 

 and precluded the eruptions of a cataclysmic war. Liabilities cease to be dis- 

 tinguishable from assets. 



"6 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, Vol. II, p. 1417. 

 2" Ibid., pp. 1448-1449. 

 2" Ibid., p. 1449. 



