1552 



The Soviet achievement carried the implication that the Soviet Union had 

 mastered the primary technology required for an intercontinental ballistic missile. 

 At one stroke, this achievement erased the issue of the "Bomber Gap," created a 

 "Missile Gap," rendered obsolete the elaborate earl}^ warning system of the United 

 States against bomber attack, reduced the warning time of an attack from hours 

 to minutes, and raised the issue as to whether manned strategic bombers would 

 not soon be obsolete. It gave a practical demonstration of the possibility and ad- 

 vantages of technological surprise. And, finally, it raised the prestige of the Soviet 

 Union as a technological power of the foremost rank. 



The U.S. response was enactment of Public Law 85-568, the National Aeronau- 

 tics and Space Act, approved July 29, 1958. From this point on, the American 

 space program was launched on an arduous and costly technological course for 

 more than a decade of competition with the Soviet Union; it was to embrace a 

 tremendous range of scientific investigations, technological concepts, and practical 

 applications. Most importantly, for the purposes of this study, it was a form of 

 activity of inherent importance in international relations: its achievements were 

 prestigious and enabled the United States to recover and even raise its diplomatic 

 stature; its operations were obviously global in nature and required the cooperation 

 of many nations; and the exploitation of its technological capabilities offered 

 attractive rewards to many nations, developed and undeveloped alike. 



While space was later to be formally abjured as a military combat regime, 

 satellites obviously offered great advantages for surveillance (which would con- 

 tribute to the stabihty of the mutual deterrence evolving between the United States 

 and the Soviet Union). Surveillance from space also offered a way out of the 

 awkward impasse presented by Soviet reluctance to admit any form of external 

 inspection as an adjunct of arms control agreements. ^^ 



The new space program made heavy demands on the Federal budget 

 and caused some reshaping of both executive and legislative branch 

 machinery. In addition to the establishment of NASA, there were 

 radical changes in the Federal structure for national and international 

 science policy and programs, including the appointment of a Science 

 Adviser to the President and the location of the President's Science 

 Advisory Committee directly within the White House — ^a step which, 

 according to Berkner, had profound implications for making the needs 

 of science, scientific research, and science education discussed and 

 understood at top governmental levels. ^^ The expanded science 

 advisory apparatus within the Executive Office led in turn to creation 

 of the post of Assistant Secretary for Science and Technology, or 

 equivalent, in most old-line departments. 



Within the State Department, which had created an Office of 

 Science Adviser in 1950 and assigned science attaches to several West 

 European countries but had curtailed these activities in 1955, the 

 science function was revived. Science attaches were appointed to serve 

 at U.S. Embassies in London, Paris, Rome, Bonn, Stockholm, Tokyo, 

 Moscow, New Delhi, and some South American countries. 



To promote military applications of space research, the position of 

 Director of Research and Engineering was established within the 

 Department of Defense, ranking above the Assistant Secretaries of 

 Defense and possessing the authority to manage interservice projects 

 without following the normal military chain of command. This senior 

 officer was supported by an Office of the Director of Defense Research 

 and Engineering and by the [Defense] Advanced Research Projects 

 Agency. 



45 Huddle, The Ki'ohition of Iiilrrriatinnal Technology, vol. II, [i. 6.3-4. 

 <» Bullis, op. cit., p. Xi~. 



