1541 



its introduction in tlie United States. On the whole, the discovery and 

 use of atomic energy has afforded the United States new sources of 

 leverage for its diplomacy, complicated the conduct of that diplomacy^, 

 and in many ways fmidamentally changed relations between major 

 world powers. By mid- 1977, however, foreign progress in nuclear 

 technology and the inability of the United States to sign new contracts 

 for enrichment service had begun to erode U.S. influence. 



RELEVANCE OF STUDY THEMES TODAY 



The main themes of the study of this case appear to be as relevant 

 in mid-1977, or more so, than at the time of writing in the latter half 

 of 1972. Events and factors influencing today's themes include: 



— The oil embargo of 1973-74, followed b}^ the enormous price 

 rise in Middle East oil, which reawakened foreign interest in nu- 

 clear power, particularly in the United Kingdom, Europe, and 

 Japan. Conventional wisdom (which a healthy skepticism may 

 temper) now assumes that by the year 2000 as much as half of the 

 electricity used by these countries will come from nuclear power- 

 plants. Their development of strong nuclear industries will have 

 implications for future U.S. diplomacy and foreign policy. 



— The detonation of a nuclear explosive device by the Gov- 

 ernment of India on May 18. 1974, which provided a strong 

 reminder that countries other than the leading industrial ones 

 can, if they wish, acquire a capability to make a few nuclear 

 weapons. There is some concern, for example, that South Korea 

 may try to make nuclear weapons if the United States withdraws 

 its ground forces. 



— The congressional concern expressed in 1974 over the ade- 

 quacy of nonproliferation conditions for then proposed bilateral 

 agreements between the United States and Iran, Israel, and Egypt 

 to help them acquire and use the technology for nuclear power . 

 production ; over arrangements between AVest Germany and Brazil 

 for the former to supply the latter with nuclear powerplants and 

 a factory to recover plutonium from used fuels ; and over a French 

 contract to supply fuel reprocessing plants to South Korea and 

 Pakistan. 



— The May 1975 NPT review conference in Geneva, which stim- 

 ulated interest in many of the subjects covered in the study. 



— The 1974 cutoiT of new enrichment supply contracts by the 

 Atomic Energy Commission (functions now assumed by ERDA), 

 which revived foreign interest in nuclear enrichment plants and 

 damaged the credibility of the United States as a reliable source 

 of enrichment services. 



— President Carter's early nonproliferation initiatives to dis- 

 courage world use of plutonium as a fuel and to provide terminal 

 storage of spent fuel without reprocessing. 

 With the benefit of 5 years of hindsight, Dr. Donnelly says that if 

 he were to rewrite this report he would give more attention to : 



— The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 

 international nuclear safeguards under the Non-Proliferation 

 Treaty, and U.S. support of that role. 



— The interaction between the IAEA and Euratom in the 

 carrying out of nuclear safeguards, because of the anticipated 

 importance of regional international organizations in the future. 



