1582 



credits were extended. By 1966, President Lyndon Johnson was 

 urging increased economic exchanges to "build bridges" to East 

 European countries, (pp. 534-535) 



ACCELERATED MOVEMENT TOWARD DETENTE 



With the advent of the Nixon Presidency, the exploration of means 

 toward detente accelerated. One means of correcting recurring balance- 

 of-payments deficits was expanded trade with the Communist coun- 

 tries to increase exports, production, and employment. A Presidential 

 Commission in 1971 proposed that: "Within the bounds set by stra- 

 tegic considerations, the United States should attempt to expand its 

 trade with Communist countries." Export restrictions and tariffs 

 should be eased and multilateral trade arrangements explored for 

 this i)urpose. (p. 535) 



B}^ the close of 1971 the pace of events quickened. The Peterson 

 Report in December noted that the countries of the Communist 

 world were trading more extensively with the West and urged a new 

 U.S. approach to Communist tracle in order to improve the trade 

 prospects of the United States and to open the way for Communist 

 countries to join the world trading and monetar}^ community, (p. 536) 

 In November 1971 Secretary of Commerce Stans went to Moscow 

 to discuss trade matters; he was followed in April 1972 by Secretary 

 of Agriculture Butz. These missions encouraged expectations of a 

 substantial increase in U.S. -Soviet trade. Then in May 1972 came 

 the Summit Meeting at which a Joint Commercial Commission was 

 created to negotiate an overall trade agreement (including reciprocal 

 most-favored-nation or MFN provision), arrangements for reciprocal 

 availability of credit and facilities to promote trade, and an arbitra- 

 tion arrangement to resolve trade disputes. By this time also, the 

 Soviet authorities appeared disposed to press for early resolution of 

 the issues that had obstructed trade between the two countries. Thus: 



On July 8, 1972, an agreement was reached providing credit through the 

 Commodity Credit Corporation for Soviet purchases of American grain. A mari- 

 time agreement was conchided on October 14, 1972, which removed several 

 barriers to commercial shipping between the two countries. On October 18, 1972, 

 a commercial agreement and a settlement of the Soviet Lend-Lease debt were 

 signed. The commercial agreement projected a tripling of U.S.-Soviet trade 

 within a 3-year period and provided a number of regulatory measures. The 

 lend-lease settlement arranged a repavmcnt schedule for the Soviet World War II 

 debt to the United States, (p. 538) 



Although the discussions of the series of agreements projected 

 optimistic consequences for future trade between the two countries, 

 the significant technological lag of the U.S.S.R. in other areas than 

 mihtary and space offered less reason for these expectations. Soviet 

 economic relations with the West rested mainly on technology trans- 

 fers to the relatively backward Soviet industries, paid for by exports 

 of raw materials. This structure of trade was unlikely to be quickly 

 altered by the new agreements. 



U.S. Involvement 



Assessment of the implications for the United States of the trade 

 agreements \v\i\\ the Soviet Union must consider both costs and 

 benefits, problems as well as opportunities, and arrangements to 

 fulfill the expectations raised by the agreements. 



