1733 



reactive mode was highly time-dependent. A planning team qualified 

 to work in either mode was likely to find its energies totally absorbed 

 by the needs of decisionmakers for policy guidance on immediate 

 problems. Inherently these would be reactions to external develop- 

 ments. Accordingly^ the study raised the question as to the desirability 

 of staffing separately for both modes. Such a scheme was tentatively 

 suggested for the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. 

 Also, in view of the large scientific and technological content of both 

 initiatives and problems of reaction, a similar division in planning was 

 suggested for the Department's Science Bureau. Moreover, it was 

 pointed out that there needed to be a close working relationship 

 between the long-range (i.e., initiatives development) elements of the 

 Planning Staff and OES, as well as between the reactive element of the 

 Planning Staff and the operational people in OES.^^^ 



The requirements of the Department are summed up as follows: 



There needs to be a deeper appreciation of the relationship between U.S. 

 technological developments and the U.S. international posture, and of the poten- 

 tial contributions to U.S. diplomacy of foreseeable futui'e technological 

 developments. 



The heart of science and technology is invention and change. The problem is 

 to relate this force for change to diplomacy. It implies for the diplomatic process 

 the encouragement of creativeness and increased receptivity toward innovation. 



More particularly, the rate of technological change and its impacts on the 

 diplomatic environment call for a strengthened abUity of the functional bureaus 

 to perceive and interpret these changes and impacts, around the world, and for an 

 increased alertness to the predictive power of technology analysis and f orecasting.*^" 



Of course there is no guarantee that even the best organized and 

 staft'ed teams for planning initiatives and designing responses to 

 external events can win acceptance of their concepts and expedients. 

 As the study points out: 



One problem that aU institutions concerned with policy analysis encounter is in 

 being believed by those who make decisions on policy issues. There are repeated 

 instances of studies that clearly identified a future danger, or the need to prevent 

 a future crisis, and were neglected until the event occurred. Unfortunately, there 

 are also repeated instances of forecasts of disaster that didn't happen after all. 

 It is worth noting, however, that the confidence level of any technology forecast 

 rises not merely when it is accepted by more critics but when it is subjected to 

 deeper and more comprehensive analysis. But while the confidence level of a 

 study may improve with effort, it is less likely that its political acceptability or 

 credibility will be correspondingly enhanced. Guidance on this problem calls for 

 much further study .2*° 



One entire section (pages 1487-1489) of the study addressed the 

 question of sources of foreign policy initiatives in science and tech- 

 nology. It proposed fom* categories of such initiatives: 



The technical aspects of diplomacy can be categorized roughly as follows: (1) 

 policies to encourage the international advance of basic science, e.g., support for 

 the International Biological Program; (2) policies to advance and exploit the 

 national posture in technology, e.g., agreements for the sale of enriched uranium 

 fuel elements; (3) policies to deal with global or international problems calling for 

 technological resolution, e.g., satellite survej^s of pollution sources and diffusion 

 patterns; and (4) policies employing science and technology to alter diplomatic 

 relationship in some beneficial way, e.g., U.S.-U.S.S.R. science agreement ta 

 further detente. ^^i 



358 Ibid.: see especially pages 1422-1426. 



359 Ibid., p. 1449. 



360 Ibid., p. 1468. 



361 Ibid., pp. 1487-1488. 



