1853 



Formal adoption of mechanisms of economic planning in the United 

 States occurred by enactment of the Employment Act of 1946/" 

 Creation of the Policy Planning Staff in the Office of the Secretary of 

 State in 1947 gave recognition of the need for planning in support of 

 U.S. diplomacy.^*^ The need of the Congress for a planning institution 

 concerned with the impact of science and technology on U.S. society 

 led in 1972 to the creation of a congressional Office of Technology 

 Assessment.'^' 



However, the area of interaction between diplomacy and both 

 science and technology has remained a kind of no man's land, insofar 

 as planning is concerned. Bits of responsibility are distributed through- 

 out both the legislative and executive branches, but no mechanism 

 exists to bring a general coherence to the various planning activities. 

 More importantly, no mechanism exists to mobilize and apply for the 

 achievement of diplomatic goals the two preeminent strengths of 

 the United States: technological skill and managerial expertise. 

 Although the principle of "planning" as an abstraction seems to have 

 won some measure of acceptance and respectability since John 

 Dewey's 1939 definition of its democratic role, the practice and 

 application of planning for diplomatic programs of action seem still 

 to be awaiting some kind of further confirmation and support. The 

 reason for this delayed acceptance may lie in the uncertainty over 

 whether diplomatic planning should address the immediate future or 

 the decades ahead. How indeed should American skills in technology 

 and management be employed to prepare to solve the diplomatic 

 problems of 1976 or 2001, in view of the many imponderables in the 

 way? On the other hand, is it possible that those who are expert 

 in technology and management might be able to help identify and 

 assess these very imponderables and translate uncertainties into 

 probabilities? 



Weaknesses of Short-Range Planning 



It is an oft-repeated truism of military lore that any plan promptly 

 implemented is superior to the best plan executed belatedly. Catastro- 

 phes as well as successes have resulted from adherence to this doctrine. 

 But even granting the virtue of speed in military tactics, there is a 

 profound difference between military combat and diplomacy. War 

 is a zero-sum game in which the enemy's loss equals the home force's 

 gain; when ideally pursued diplomacy is a non-zero-sum game in 

 which both sides win. A treaty that benefits only one signatory will 

 not be long preserved. For this reason alone, more skill is required in 

 diplomacy than in warfare. (The historical frequency of conffict 

 suggests that more attention should be given to the skills of diplo- 

 macy.) 



The timing of international relations planning is conditioned by 

 the fact that the elements useful to modern diplomacy are slow in 

 developing. They center on technology, economics, and social action. 



*" Public Law 79-304. However, for an account of earlier plannmg and goal-setting in the United States 

 see The Evolution and Dynamics of National OoaU in the United States (U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee 

 on Interior and Insular Affairs, prepared by Franklin P. Huddle. Science Policy Research Division, Con- 

 gressional Research Service, Library of Congress, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971, 58 pages. Com- 

 mittee print.) 



'*- Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 1412-1414. 



^3 Ibid., p. 1501. 



