1566 



from my four trips to the area for President Johnson and siiljscquent visits. Whih; 

 I did not visit North Vietnam, I understand from C. L. Sulzberger's trip to Hanoi 

 and other accounts that some poHtical figures there were quite interested in the 

 possibihty of sharing in the proposed major develo])ment effort. At the same time 

 it was as xmreaUstic in 1965 as it is today [March 1972] to believe that leaders in 

 North Vietnam [bent] on conquest of the South would abandon their goals simply 

 in response to offers of aid." 



Assessment 



Stiul}^ of the Mekong projecit as a particular undertaking, a model 

 venture in regionalism, and as the subject of a major wartime political 

 initiative affords a number of significant insights. 



One is that "as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of co- 

 operation in a regional development scheme does not present a con- 

 vincing opportunity." " Or, to put it in more specific terms, "The 

 response of the Hanoi authorities . . . appears to have demon- 

 strated . . . that 'dollar diplomacy' does not convince an adversary 

 as long as there is any reasonable prospect that he can outlast the 

 United vStates without some form of capitulation." '^ 



THE MOMENTU.M OF NONPOLITICIZED REGIONALISM 



Another is that a regional enterprise which is essentially apolitical 

 and at the same time promises tangible economic benefits throughout 

 the region may develop a momentum powerful enough to keep it going 

 despite traditional animosities between groups \\ithin the region, and 

 even under complex conditions of war. "Perhaps the most notable 

 events to be chronicled about the Mekong scheme from its inception 

 to early 1965, a period of more than a decade, were the events that did 

 not happen": 



The rather improvised Coordination Committee was able to maintain coherence 

 and control, as well as forward movement. The four Riparian States, despite 

 several .serious diplomatic contretemps, continued their active participation and 

 cooperation in the conunittee. Communist factions in all four states did not 

 impede the field studies or construction, and a minimum of guerrilla incidents 

 were reported, even as the conflict in Vietnam worsened."" 



Underpinning this phenomenon is a range of attractive character- 

 istics shared by development enterprises ^vhich involve multinational 

 regions and multilateral relationships: 



Emphasis is on local participation in development and planning; 



Subregions in greatest need and offering greatest opportunity for advancement 

 tend to receive priority by local consent; 



Nati<malistic preoccupations appear to be moderated; 



Self-help is encouraged and stimulated by being made more effective in com- 

 bined actions with mutual support; 



National .sensitivities that bilateral aid would exacerbate are less abraded by 

 multinational arrangements; 



Regional cohesiveness — the tendency for people of different countries working 

 together on a shared problem to lay aside their national differences — can result 

 from attention to geographic regional goals rather than formal national boundaries; 



Burdens of foreign aid tend to be more widely distributed; and 



The process of applying technological means to social and economic objectives 

 can be made coherent and understandable to those who expect to enjoy the 

 benefits.**' 



" Ihid. 



"S The MikoiKl Project, vol. I. p. lliO. 



7» Ibid., I). 424. 



8" Ibid., p. :v.iA. 



81 Ibid., p. 4:il. 



