1657 



The review was never completed. According to the IC, FCST, 

 "preparation of the report has posed far more difficulties than had 

 been foreseen. Among the difficulties . . . [was] the lack of compara- 

 bility between the submissions of various agencies. . . ." 



At the beginning of this commentary on Scientists Abroad it was 

 suggested that an even more important problem than those of the 

 direction, coordination, and evaluation of technical exchange pro- 

 grams might be the antecedent problem of providing a coherent policy 

 context. An example of such a context with respect to U.S. scientific 

 programs in Europe is provided by Victor Basiuk, writing in 1972: 



Present American scientific and technological policy ... is largely ad hoc and 

 unfocused. There is concentration on individual countries and programs, on tar- 

 gets of opportunity. But there is no overall view which would take into consider- 

 ation the nature and requirements of upcoming technologies, especially their 

 large scale and high cost. As a result, the United States has been drifting in the 

 direction of bilateral cooperation with European nations. . . . This course is not 

 adequate. To meet the requirements of the large-scale technology of the future 

 and of the immense costs associated with it, Western Europe must develop a large 

 market and cohesive internal institution. Compartmentalized bilateral relation- 

 ships between the United States and individual Western European nations bypass 

 this objective.2i* 



Basiuk concludes that the absence of multilateral cooperative? 

 scientific relationships with Europe imperils transatlantic security: 



If Washington does not soon develop a concerted science and technology policy, 

 it is foreclosing options for the late 1970s and early 1980s in a way that almost 

 guarantees insecurity in Europe. The enormous complexity of the task is no 

 excuse for not addressing it. Small-scale, bilateral cooperation may postpone 

 the peril, but it cannot in the end avert it.^'* 



In a statement to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics 

 in January 1971, Chairman Daddario of the Subcommittee on Science, 

 Research, and Development addressed the same theme, but more 

 broadly : 



... It has become evident that the concept of sovereignty and the traditional 

 means of conducting relations between nations are no longer sufficient. The reason 

 for this is that technology has largely changed the world, and in doing so it has 

 rendered the old framework very vulnerable. Today, we are witnessing an in- 

 creasinglj'^ rapid compression of both time and space. . . . This has led to the con- 

 temporary paradox whereby the human race is simultaneously becoming more 

 unified and more fragmented. We now seem to have a dichotomy on our hands — ■ 

 either lasting cooperation or complete political dissolution — the potential for 

 either being greater than in any previous period in human history.21* 



Daddario suggested that the development of individual national 

 science policies is no longer enough to meet today's foreign policy 

 and — a consensus must be readied on developing integrated policies 

 for a technologically interdependent world : 



. . . Before there will be any real global cooperation, there must be far greater 

 consensus on its purposes. What are these? Is it to enhance material well-being 

 and intellectual development? Is it economic growth or a massive educational 

 effort? Is it limited arms control or an international peace-keeping mechanism? 

 Is it expanded medical health care or more adequate housing? And what are the 

 priorities? . . . How do we reach some balance between near-term locaHzed prob- 

 lems and long-term global problems? ^^ 



2i< Ibid., p. 1033. 

 2'5 Ibid., p. 1034. 

 216 Ibid. 

 2" Ibid. 



