1660 



Is the emphasis in U.S. programs for exchange of technical person- 

 nel too exclusively bilateral? Should multilateral alternatives be pur- 

 sued? Through what channels: in existing international and regional 

 organizations, ad hoc groupings of countries with related interests, or a 

 new international mechanism established for the purpose? 



In its examination of the three major exchange programs the study 

 frequently touches on the theme that, "If they are to meet more effec- 

 tively requirements of a world increasingly dependent on science and 

 technology, and especially if they are to help significantly in recon- 

 ciling the often incompatible requirements of science and diplomacy, 

 better direction, coordination and review will be needed." ^^^ What, in 

 the light of failures to date, will it take to meet this need? How can it 

 be met without resort to massive bureaucratic methods? 



How incompatible, in fact, are the requirements of science and di- 

 plomacy? Can competent scientists and technologists serve forthright 

 national purposes — assuming that the}^ do not become involved in the 

 immediacies of international politics — without compromising scientific 

 integrity? Is the answer to tliis question partly a matter of the world 

 view of the President and his key science advisers, and of the profes- 

 sional qualifications of the latter? 



Is it perhaps the diplomats, with their predilection for seat-of-the- 

 panis deciionmakirig and their traditional aversion to research, 

 rather than the scientists and technologists, with their disciplined ac- 

 ceptance of the systems approach and meticulous documentation, who 

 are responsible for persistent failures in reporting, review, and evalua- 

 tion? In developing reporting and evaluation s} stems for the various 

 exchange programs, would it be useful to seek the recommendations 

 of teams of representative scientists and technologists on ways to 

 exploit (a) the disciplined habits of scientists and technologists, (b) 

 the organizational know-how of most technologists, and (c) the sensi- 

 tivity as to political non-involvement of many scientists? 



One observer with outstanding qualifications for judging the success 

 or failure of scientific exchanges — Dr. Harrison Brown, longtime 

 Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences who retired 

 from that post in 1974 — has said of the U.S. -Soviet exchanges: 



... As a result of contacts between Soviet scientists and American scientists 

 there have been some rather extraordinary foreign policy changes. I have seen 

 attitudes of the scientists of one country change enormously as a result of these 

 contacts. I have seen people come to the United States who had preconceived 

 concepts . . . which were dramatically changed during their visit. I would say 

 that if it had not been for these contacts we would not today have a Test Ban 

 Treaty . . . nor would we be as far along the path toward the eventual signing 

 of the Nonproliferation Treaty; nor would we have the SALT talks. . . .^^^ 



Are broad evaluations like this by knowledgeable persons perhaps 

 more nformative than elaborate built-in systems of detailed reporting 

 and analysis? If systematically conducted, could they substitute for 

 the latter? Would a combination of the two evaluation methods be 

 preferable to reliance on either one alone? 



How important is it that the American public be informed about the 

 various exchange programs — their purposes, scope, problems, and 

 accomplishments? Should the executive branch make more of an 



-22 Knezo, Scientists Abroad, vol. II, p. 1021. 

 223 /bid., p. 1011. 



