1696 



apparatus to maintain forward impetus on 19 complex programs^ 

 many of them involving technological as well as economic and in- 

 stitutional innovations. Can the Department present these programs 

 effectively to the Congress to obtain the requisite funding support? 

 Can it obtain public support? Can it coordinate the necessary partici- 

 pation by the long list of mission departments and agencies? Can it 

 keep track of all the bilateral programs involved? Can it assure 

 adequate U.S. voice and staffing in U.N. institutions? 



And, from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, can the Congress 

 equip itself with the staff expertise to maintain oversight of the 

 prospective array of new responsibihties proposed by the Secretary of 

 State? 



Many, indeed most, of the initiatives presented to the General 

 Assembly in the September 1 address find echoes in the 12 case and 

 issue studies of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. How- 

 ever, the studies also record the shortfalls in past efforts to achieve these 

 objectives. The Secretary's address has served a useful purpose in 

 gathering together a comprehensive roster of global strategies for 

 world betterment. It has also provided a measure of the enormous 

 future task facing U.S. technological diplomacy. 



NEW STUDY OF STATE DEPARTMENT'S MANAGEMENT OF DIPLOMACY- 

 TECHNOLOGY INTERFACE 



There are indications of a deepening concern within the Department 

 of State both as to its own responsibilities in science and technology 

 and as to th e need fo r a strengthened organizational structure to 

 exercise these responsibilities. One important indication of this con- 

 cern was the commissioning in January 1976 of a special study by 

 Dr. T. Keith Glennan, formerly Commissioner of AEC and Adminis- 

 trator of NASA. This study, requested by then Under Secretary of 

 State for Economic Affairs (later Deputy Secretary of State) 

 Charles W. Robinson, required wide consultation among Government, 

 industry, and academic people concerned with the science-technology- 

 diplomacy interface and reporting back in the autumn of 1976 on 

 departmental options for such matters as : 



— The extent and nature of the contributions of science and 

 technology to U.S. diplomatic objectives, and past strengths and 

 weaknesses in this area; 



— The nature, problems, and opportunities, and program 

 priorities in technological developments of substantial impact on 

 U.S. foreign affairs; and 



— The organization, management responsibilities, internal re- 

 lations, and external relations of the Bureau of Oceans and 

 International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. . 

 Tlie tlirust of the (xlennan study differed substantially from that 

 performed by Lloyd Berkner in 1950. The experience of the interven- 

 ing quarter-century has occasioned a shift in emphasis from science 

 to technology, and fr-om peripheral concern to central programmatic 

 planning and action. 



Among the sources used by Dr. Glennan and others with whom 

 he consulted in preparing his i-e})ort were studies in the Science, Tech- 

 nology, and American Diplomacy series, especially Science and Tech- 



