1699 



avoiding surprises by looking ahead. On the surface, the methodical 

 approach of the second school, which parallels what has long and 

 effectively been done in American industry, would seem superior — but 

 is it? Can it be applied successfully on the grand scale, in the governance 

 of human affairs taken all together? 



What kinds of foreign policy issues involve science and technology? 

 Are there any that do not? What kind of technical expertise would 

 help improve State Department pohcy planning and decisionmaking? 

 What are the options as to arrangements for tapping such expertise? 

 How important is the availability of a multidisciplinary team that is 

 experienced enough in bureaucratic ways to be effective but brings a 

 fresh perspective? Should it be built into the system (with periodic 

 rotation), or called in as needed? 



The study, discussing the issue of generalists versus specialists,^^^. 

 puts this question more specifically. "The issue is many-sided: what 

 sp ecialties ar e most needed? Can they be recruited and trained up to 

 the necessary level? Should promotions be arbitrarily given equally 

 as between specialists and generalists? Might specialists be brought 

 into the Service at appropriate levels as needed, on a temporary 

 basis? Is it fair to specialists to convert them into generalists in 

 order for them to merit progress up the promotion ladder? Can the 

 Foreign Service Officer be both?" 



It has been observed that foreign policy planning is unlikely to 

 succeed because those in power do not believe in it. Are human 

 motivations the main sticking point? Could a dynamic President who 

 had concluded that systematic long-range foreign policy planning was 

 necessary gain congressional and public acceptance of it? What safe- 

 guard against abuses of Executive power might be needed in institu- 

 tionalizing long-range planning? How might public debate on foreign 

 policy issues, and public participation in policy formulation regarding 

 them, best be arranged? Should Congress encourage the institutional- 

 ization of systematic, long-range foreign policy planning? If not, why 

 not? If so, what arrangements should Congress make for carrying out 

 its dual role of supporter and critic of the system? Does the above- 

 cited suggestion regarding a congressional policy planning staff have 

 merit in this connection? 



The report which followed the 1972 Hearing-Symposium on 

 National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment 

 made the following proposals: 



. . . that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Foreign Relations 

 Committee, and other appropriate committees of the Congress should: 



(1) Hold annual hearings on the foreign policy reports to the Congress of the 

 President and the Secretary of State as well as on the foreign policy implications 

 of the economic report to the President and the President's message on the state 

 of the world. 



(2) Establish machinery and procedures for systematically and periodically 

 assessing the long-term foreign policy goals and programs of the United States; 

 for example, by the creation of a high-level advisory panel composed of public 

 officials and private persons, and/or by systematic and periodic review through 

 congressional hearings. 



(3) Hold hearings and/or establish advisory panels which would: 



(a) develop criteria to determine more clearly what constitute the vital 

 security interests of the United States; 



3i» Ibid., pp. 1332-1333. 



