1700 



(b) establish guidelines to determine what commitments must be based 

 on treaties and what role executive agreements can and should play; 



(c) set criteria to guide the conduct of foreign policy in such traditional 

 fields as the protection of American citizens, property, and investment 

 abroad; freedom of the seas, and access to markets and sources of raw 

 materials; 



(d) examine the decisionmaking process in foreign affairs, particularly 

 the roles of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council as 

 well as the potential roles of the Cabinet and other executive agencies con- 

 cerned with domestic affairs; 



(e) examine the extent to which social science research can be more effec- 

 tively utilized in guiding the formulation and execution of U.S. policy toward 

 the other nations and cultures of the world; 



(f) conduct periodic reviews of the security, political, and economic impli- 

 cations of U.S. foreign bases, including the sharing of bases and costs with 

 our allies. 



(4) Request the Office of Management and Budget to prepare foreign expendi- 

 ture budgets in terms of balance of payment implications. 



(5) Enact legislation to require the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelli- 

 gence staffs of other executive departments and agencies to report their relevant 

 studies and intelligence assessments to appropriate congres^onal committees in 

 executive session and to qualified staff members. 



(6) Hold hearings on the various efiforts of all government agencies and depart- 

 ments involved in the development of programs dealing with the protection of 

 the international environment and natural resources. 



(7) Encourage by every means possible public discussion of foreign policy 

 questions.'^"^ 



As extensive as these recommendations were, one of the witnesses^ 

 Professor Robert A. Scalapino of the University of CaUfornia at 

 Berkeley, suggested the need for still further congressional inquiry 

 and action. In his prepared statement he said: 



No current body, however, exists which by virtue of its structure and personnel 

 can address itself systematically and regularly to the most fundamental issues 

 concerning foreign policy objectives and strategy in such a fashion as to involve 

 the Congress and the public as well as the national administration. In my opinion,. 

 it is time to give this matter the most serious consideration.^^* 



Is there indeed a need for new congressional machinery, procedures, 

 and actions as indicated by these proposals? Would a new Joint Com- 

 mittee on National Security, as proposed by the Murphy Commission, 

 be an effective instrument for stimulating, accompUshing, or support- 

 ing the purposes reflected in the proposals — -or, as some believe, would 

 it merely "add to the confusion"? If the Joint Committee formula 

 should be adopted, should the scope of the committee be broadened 

 to cover long-range foreign policy planning in general? What, for that 

 matter, do the words "national security" really encompass? Should 

 there be a special arrangement for long-range assessment support of 

 such a committee by the Office of Technology Assessment? For policy 

 analysis support by the Congressional Research Service? Would it 

 not need at least a modest policy analysis staff of its own? 



The study points out ^^^. that a large effort is already being invested 

 in the congressional review of broad policy matters involving the 

 interaction of science, technology, and U.S. foreign policy. "The value 

 of these reviews seems compelHng, but the limitations of member time 

 and staff resources may prevent wider use of them. Among the possi- 

 bilities to enlarge or increase the scope or frequency of such overviews 

 might be the following:" 



320 Ibid., pp. 1456 and 1457. 

 32' Ibid., p. 1457. 

 322 Ibid., p. 1466. 



