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short- and long-range planning necessary to achieve them, and dis- 

 advantages in a foreign policy posture which essentially reacts to 

 external developments as they occur. Evidence drawn from the 12 cases 

 and issue studies, reviewed in turn, appears to support the contention 

 that in the two centuries of its history the United States has tended 

 away from the intitiative and toward the reactive mode. The choice 

 is not absolute, since virtually all dipomatic situations involve a 

 mixture of initiative and reactive behavior; what matters is where the 

 emphasis is placed. Concentration on reactive rather than initiative 

 diplomacy — although the accustomed course for most nations at 

 most periods in their history — appears to risk the greater dangers to a 

 nation's security in an increasingly dangerous world, as well as to 

 incur the heavier management demands without compensating 

 rewards, whereas the initiative mode offers the greater benefits at 

 lower risk. The main requirements of an initiative diplomatic mode in 

 a technological age are planning institutions well endowed with 

 information, policy analysis, and technology assessment capabilities, 

 and having the respect of and continuous intercommunication with 

 the makers of policy. 



The essay on "Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relation- 

 ships" (ch. 19) examines a topic which does not seem to have received 

 enough systematic analysis. The object of such analysis should be to 

 identify circumstances in which bilateral, multilateral, or variations 

 on or mixtures of the two kinds of relationship, can best advance 

 diplomatic goals. The 12 studies illustrate some of the many possi- 

 bilities ; they also suggest that, whereas both bilateral and multilateral 

 agreements on scientific and technological subjects have important 

 diplomatic roles, the growing trend toward interdependence is moving 

 the United States (along with other nations) in the direction of 

 increasing reliance on multilateral relationships. Meanwhile, even the 

 bilateral agreements into which the United States has entered, in- 

 volving relatively simple and controlled situations, have been reached 

 more as a result of improvisation than of careful planning; as a result, 

 less has been learned about their management, and how to evaluate 

 them, than needs to be known if they are to serve ihe best diplomatic 

 interests of the United States. As for the U.S. role in the complex 

 and numerous multilateral arrangements that are coming to govern 

 much of the world's business, particular study is merited of how to 

 achieve more effective program management structures and proce- 

 dures, including procedures whereby Congress can obtain detailed 

 facts not now available about multilateral program costs and benefits. 



"High-Technology Diplomacy Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy" 

 (ch. 20) focuses on technology policy as such. The evidence of the 12 

 studies is that technology is a major and integral component of the 

 substance of diplomacy; the success of a nation's diplomacy today 

 will depend in large measure on the understanding of technology that 

 it brings to policy councils and the skill with which it marshals and 

 manages its technological resources. Yet the Government of the 

 nation that, overall, leads the world in technology has not demon- 

 strated a clear perception of the limitations — from the standpoint of 

 diplomatic advantage — of high-technology achievements, however 

 spectacular, or of the benefits to be gained by systematically seeking 

 to acquire low-technology know-how wherever foreign industries have 



