1710 



and the defensive requirements of ecology. A case in point in the last 

 connection is provided by Japanese efforts to solve the problem of 

 pollution by relocating dirty industries from Japan to developing 

 countries with their raw materials, cheap labor, and presumed room 

 for growth. But environmental pollution cannot indefinitely be 

 exported nor neatly contained. The problem of pollution in Japan is 

 thus shaping up as a classic dilemma of interdependence; the ultimate 

 dilemma it appears to foreshadow — that of limiting growth — will be 

 an indefinitely more complex and difficult problem of interdependence, 

 in its time. Meanwhile, the technology -related, increasingly inter- 

 connected problems of the present are exceeding the capabilities of 

 governments; the organization of the U.S. Government for the man- 

 agement of international affairs is based on "assumptions which are 

 quite inconsistent with the facts of international life . . . there is not 

 nearly enough room in the foreign policy establishment for strategic 

 long-range planning, especially on the widening range of 'interde- 

 pendence issues'." In a broader sense, expanding interdependence — 

 though not a cause of human problems in the same primary way that 

 population growth or maldistribution of food and materials are 

 causes — represents a condition to be dealt with directly with the best 

 insights and the greatest creativeness in social invention that people 

 and governments can command. 



The need for foreign policy planning is the theme of the last, and in 

 many ways the most central, of the six essays: "Long-Range and 

 Short-Range Planning." Despite the difficulties and problems that 

 governmental planning in a democracy entaUs (in addition to the 

 characteristically American antiplanning bias, rooted in the pioneer 

 tradition of self-reliance) , the planning of foreign policy measures on a 

 long-time scale has many advantages. Among them are the suscepti- 

 bility of such planning to both congressional and public debate and the 

 building of a consensus; the allowance of time for the maturing of 

 technological initiatives that serve diplomatic purposes; and the 

 opportunity for multilateral collaboration with nations sharing the 

 same planning goals. Short-range planning, by contrast, tends to be 

 action-oriented, narrow in scope, closely held and thus not open to 

 public (and often even congressional) participation, and reactive 

 rather than initiative. As a further consideration, a new mode of 

 planning, of wider scope and longer time span, needs to be adopted to 

 deal with national security as it must be understood today. Many 

 technologies outside the strictly military sphere now have important 

 implications for national security — technologies in the fields of trans- 

 portation, communications, energy, chemicals and drugs, recording 

 and rapid manipulation of data, and so on. These factors suggest the 

 necessity of redefining national security in terms of the modern, 

 independent, technologically oriented system of nations, and of 

 restating the national goals that are implied by the new definition. 



Abundant evidence of need for long-range planning capabilities and 

 practices in the executive branch is found in the 12 case and issue 

 studies. Also evident is a parallel need in the Congress. The Murphy 

 Commission study gave detailed attention to the organizational needs 

 of the executive branch in equipping itself for more substantial and 

 longer-range diplomatic planning efforts than have been undertaken 



