1723 



The interest of the Department of State in the IGY was minimal — 

 perhaps in recognition of the fact that the scientific community delib- 

 erately preferred to do its own planning and to avoid any stigma of 

 nationalistic innovation. Nevertheless, the scientists gratefully ac- 

 cepted assistance in travel arrangements of U.S. nationals abroad and 

 foreign visitors to the United States. The question remains as to what 

 further contributions to U.S. diplomatic goals, and more generally to 

 global peace and amity, might result from activities of the world's 

 scientific community, and what encouragement by the Department 

 would increase such contributions. It would be of interest in the so- 

 called "Pugwash" conferences of scientists studying global security 

 and welfare, the "Club of Rome" studies of world resources and popu- 

 lation problems, and various international conferences of scientists 

 and technologists in particular disciplines. Some participants, notably 

 those from Communist countries, have their expenses paid by their 

 governments. Should possible roles of the Department of State in sup- 

 porting any of these international private activities of scientists and 

 technologists be examined? On the other hand, the attitude of the De- 

 partment toward such nongovernmental study groups of scientists has 

 tended to be protective and overcautious. What assurance might the 

 Department require before adopting a more positive and constructive 

 stance toward these activities? 



CASE four: the MEKONG PROJECT 



The thrust of this case is an assessment of the failure of an attempted 

 initiative by President Johnson in a speech of April 7, 1965, offering 

 to substitute regional development of the Lower Mekong Basin — with 

 substantial U.S. funding — for continued conflict. 



A possible conclusion suggested in the study was that the fatal fault 

 •in the scheme lay not in its substance but in its timing. Said the study: 



Manifestly, the contribution of the Mekong Project to an easing of the Viet- 

 namese conflict has not been significant or even measurable. The determined 

 nationalism of North Vietnam in the face of conflict has remained obdurately 

 aloof from the attractions of U.S. aid as an alternative to a prospective ultimate 

 victory. Notably also, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia adopted a not dissimilar 

 stance, apparently fearing that any U.S.-led or sponsored regional aid scheme 

 might entail dangerous compromises and reduced freedom of self-determination. 

 Accordingly, as a device to win over an adversary, the offer of cooperation in a 

 regional development scheme does not present a convincing opportunity .^^e 



It was interesting to speculate, the study went on to say, "on what 

 different course events in Southeast Asia might have followed had the 

 Johnson offer been made at the time of the Geneva Agreement of 1954 

 that partitioned Vietnam." 



The uncertainties surrounding this kind of initiative are obvious, 

 and seem to warrant further investigation. It was, said the study, 

 ""sheer speculation that a U.S. -encouraged regional development of the 

 Lower Mekong Basin in 1954 might have provided a focus for peaceful 

 economic progress, served as an educational process, and established 

 a base for wider cooperation in that disrupted region. However, the 

 question seems legitimate as to whether the consequences of a slowly 

 and deliberately encouraged regional development — region by region — 



329 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mekong Project: Opportunities and Problenis 

 of Regionalism, a studv in the series on Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy prepared for the 

 Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments by Frankhn P. Huddle, Science 

 Policy Research Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972: vol I, p. 430. 



