1732 



cataloging the "push" factors that motivate emigration of trained 

 people, and the "pull" factors that draw immigrants. Brain drain, 

 he concludes, is a "symptom of underdevelopment," and its solutions — 



... may be the primary responsibility of the LDCs, particularly the task of 

 institution-building and establishing an infrastructure of science and technology 

 as the basis for modernization, but solutions can neither be devised nor develop- 

 ment goals achieved without assistance from the advanced countries like the 

 United States. Success in diminishing the "push" factors in brain drain and in 

 resolving the dilemma of development by transforming needs into demands would 

 seem to rest upon acceptance of the principle of interdependence as a contemporary 

 fact of life in international aflFairs.^*^ 



Thus, there is still room for U.S. initiatives in helping less-developed 

 countries to build the kinds of infrastructure which will offer employ- 

 ment and challenge to citizens of the country who receive their educa- 

 tion abroad, and thereby induce them to return. Past U.S. technical 

 aid efforts have often been criticized for displacing native efforts 

 instead of developing self-help skills and institutions. The problem, 

 then, would seem to be one of taking fresh aim. 



ISSUE six: science and technology in the department of state 



This final study in the series gave considerable attention to the 

 initiative/reactive dichotomy and in particular to the administrative 

 and analytical implications of both modes. For example: 



. . . urgent operational demands on staff attention can distract attention from 

 the thinking-through of big problems, the planning of large new initiatives, and 

 the sorting-out of uncommon subtleties. This unresolved administrative issue 

 will become increasingly nagging as short-term problems of science and technology 

 multiply, while at the same time the opportunities for large initiatives tend to be 

 neglected for want of staff time and attention.^'^ 



Elsewhere the study notes that "Historically, the Department of 

 State has not been especially alert to the opportunities for technological 

 diplomacy." Documentation of this defect is offered from both a former 

 Secretary of State and the academic community .^^* Defects in the 

 analytical equipment of the Department are also scored by a senior 

 member of the Department's science staff.^^^ Elsewhere the study 

 notes : 



A persuasive case could be made that the American diplomatic style has tended 

 to be reactive rather than initiatory. This hypothesis finds support in the fact 

 that the ultimate decisions proposed are those of the President; the departmental 

 role has tended to be to staff initiatives rather than to propose them, and to analyze 

 the actions and initiatives of other nations to chart the options for U.S. responses.^** 



As to the substantive character of initiatives, the study noted that 

 since World War 11 most U.S. agencies had large foreign missions and 

 that "the bulk of the foreign contacts of U.S. agencies have a techno- 

 logical content." ^^^ 



The study called attention to the conflicting requirements of staffing 

 for initiatives in foreign policy and for the reactive mode. Both modes 

 required the same data base, broad knowledge, and analytical capabil- 

 ities. But while the initiative mode needed unhurried deliberation, the 



"2 Ibid., p. 1316. 



»^3 Huddle, Science and Technology in the Department of State, vol. II, p. 1334. 



^ Ibid., p. 1433. 



35i Ibid., pp. 1435-1436. 



»6 Ibid., p. 1491. 



3i7 Ibid., p. 1328. 



