174G 



However, there are also practical reasons for preferring multilateral 

 to bilateral regional development. Testimony on this point is offered 

 by Eugene R. Black, who suggests that a "vast program of regional 

 cooperation" was needed to "counteract the ill-effects of the Vietnam 

 War." He urged the reduction of the "U.S. presence" and the building 

 of a "strong multilateral framework." Said the study (Vol. I, pp. 

 428-429): 



As a development banker, Black is "frankly a partisan of multilateral and 

 regional organizations . . . ," because this arrangement insulates development 

 ■finance from political considerations. ("Or to put it the other way around, it 

 does not stand to reason that the U.S. Government should undertake in the name 

 of development to intervene wholesale in the domestic affairs of six dozen or so 

 poor countries.") It also is able to draw on many sources of capital and skill, and 

 promotes international cooperation.^*^ 



The study concluded with the suggestion that a regional approach 

 to multilateralism might serve as a replacement for the formalism 

 -of the United Nations: "The concept of dealing with multinational 

 geographic regions rather than with nations, and extending aid from 

 fi multinational base instead of bilaterally, has been credited in the 

 literature with a number of attractive characteristics." (The study 

 cited eight of these, page 431.) There followed some suggested ques- 

 tions for policy analysis: 



The resultant alignment of nations and international structures from a delib- 

 erate program of world regionalism acceptable to developed and developing 

 countries might warrant further study and analysis. What actions could help 

 to encourage a world system of economically and technologically better balanced 

 regions? Would there be any effect on the levels of international tensions, either 

 in the regions or in the relations among the major powers? Might regional voting 

 in the United Nations General Assembly and the associated U.N. agencies 

 provide a better or more representative arrangement than the present, admittedly 

 awkward system of one-country-one-vote? *^ 



CASE five: exploiting the resources of the seabed 



This case grew out of the evolving technology for offshore drilling 

 for oil and the emerging technology for recovery of hard minerals from 

 the deeper ocean floor. International law has traditionally viewed 

 the oceans as an international commons, with an unresolved issue 

 as to how far from shore the commons begins. Inherently, then, the 

 control of the international commons is regarded as a multilateral 

 matter, while the fixing of offshore boundaries is subject for dispute — 

 to be resolved by multilateral agreement, by bilateral agreement 

 between two nations, or by bilateral agreement between individual 

 ■claiming nations and an institution representing all interested nations. 



Pending resolution of these two sets of issues, the exploitation 

 rights to the deep ocean presumably conform with ancient practices 

 of nationality and freedom of the seas. Right of capture devolves 

 upon the nation with the best technology until a more orderly marine 

 jurisprudence can be devised and accepted. 



Claims of nations to sovereignty over a 200-mile span of coastal 

 ^'shelf" and claima of landlocked countries to a share of marine 

 riches complicate the resolution of the problem. 



One possibility is to introduce the concept of regionalism into the 

 marine environment. If, in general, the ease of resolution of issues 



3$2 Eupene R. Black: AUernativr in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 166-168. 

 383 Huddle, Mekong Project, vol. I, p. 431. 



