1764 



would also seem to be a reasonable hypothesis that those areas of 

 tcchnolo2:y in which apphed science has been least active would offei' 

 the largest scope for major progress, while those areas in which science 

 has been most intensively applied would be benefited more marginally 

 from further investment in related science. Scientists themselves make 

 a distinction of this kind when they describe a field of research as 

 being "ripe for exploitation." 



Enough has been said here to validate the thesis that the Depart- 

 ment of State has an interest in both low and high technology as these 

 relate to foreign policy. It is also apparent that different sets of policies, 

 programs, and supporting analyses are required to deal with the two 

 classes of technology in question. However, it may be of interest to 

 inquire as to what obstacles tend to obstruct the entry of the Depart- 

 ment into this field. 



OBSTACLES TO DIPLOMATIC PLANNING 



In tlio field of high technology, individual designs, pieces of hard- 

 ware, and systems have particularly potent diplomatic significance. 

 They include such items as desalting plants, nuclear power stations, 

 large-capacity computers, air defense systems, military aircraft elec- 

 tronic communication links, and so on. These tend to be costly items, 

 often one-of-a-kind, and close to the state of the art. They do not 

 lend themselves readily to economic analysis and are frequently the 

 subject of controvers}^ as between military and diplomatic policy- 

 makers. 



In the field of low technology the problems tend in general to be 

 more massive, and the significance of technology more obscure. In 

 terms of national economic significance, low technology is much more 

 important than high technology. Moreover, it is in these areas where 

 U.S. technology often appears to be lagging. It is sometimes pointed 

 out that in some of these industries (steel, for example), the United 

 States exports more technology than it imports. But it couid also be 

 true that this condition is less a measure of technological superiority 

 than of the alertness of foreign technologists to borrow — and there- 

 after to improve upon — the best U.S. technology in this field. The 

 possibility exists that U.S. technologists, corporate or governmental, 

 have not been equally alert to the opportunities to learn from foreign 

 technology when it outpaces its U.S. counterpart. 



There are historical reasons why U.S. industries tend to invent and 

 innovate rather than import technology. The early abundance of 

 industrial materials conferred a comparative advantage on this country 

 so that the pros~;ure for technologies of materials conservation could 

 be negl'^cted. Tlie great influx of European migration to the United 

 States during the 19th century brought with it a rich harvest of 

 technological expertise from many countries; an important source of 

 American ingenuity was the interaciiou among American and immi- 

 grant t'^chnologists so that names like Steinmetz and Tesla rank 

 along with Edi>on and Kettering. There was more invention in the 

 United vStates than industry could digest, so that practical interest 

 in foreign technology was minima!. 



The iinport-.mce oi" this issue is that the United States has a problem 

 of relying on imporls of materials and fuels to support a large indus- 

 trial system. Volume of imports and prices of the imports arc both 



