1770 



Seabed mining technology has merely raised anew this ancient problem 

 of international law and diplomacy. The monitoring of the oceans may 

 require high technology, but the stimulus is provided by variants of 

 technology practised by the Romans. 



CASE six: u.s.-soviet commercial relations 



The dilemma for U.S. policy explored in this study is that "ex- 

 panded economic relations which facilitate massive technology trans- 

 fer from the United States to the U.S.S.R. may create new, potentially 

 dangerous dimensions in U.S. diplomacy." Yet — 



On the other hand [the study goes on to explain] there is at least a possibility 

 that the process of integrating the centrally planned Soviet economy into the 

 market economy of the United States and the rest of the non-Communist world 

 might unleash irreversible forces of constructive change which could, in turn, 

 contribute to international interdependence and stability.*" 



In the area of food grains and low-technology products the Soviet 

 Union has been a massive but erratic customer. The questions raised 

 by the study address this feature of Soviet imports. For example: 



(1) Do Soviet requirements for U.S. technology require longer periods of com- 

 mitment than was the case in the past? (2) Does the trade agreement represent a 

 part of a new pattern of relationship between the Soviet Union and the United 

 States? and (3) Does the agreement presage a new relationship between the Soyiet 

 economy and the non-Communist world economic system? If these questions 

 can be answered affirmatively, the outlook for political and economic net benefits 

 to the United States will be favorable. ^'^ 



In discussing the policy questions of high- technology exports to the 

 Soviet Union, the study employs a fairly comprehensive definition of 

 "high" technology that encompasses such industries as "electronics, 

 agribusiness, petroleum refining, and automotive tooling and forging 

 equipment." It also cites "Advanced Industrial Systems" and "Man- 

 agement-Control-Communications Systems." While the particularities 

 of these are analyzed separately, the general conclusion is offered 

 that "Current Soviet requirements for high-technology assistance 

 from the United States appear to represent a pattern of technical 

 and managerial interrelatedness that would limit the ability of Soviet 

 leaders to take short-term advantages, borrow technology, and then 

 withdraw from continued United States-Soviet economic relations in 

 particular lines." ^^^ 



Stability of trade relations appears to be a major key to a favorable 

 and enduring trade partnership of the two countries, and both high 

 and low technology exports from the United States could be important 

 elements in this relationship. Soviet exports, on the other hand, appear 

 likely to be limited for some time to raw materials, petroleum and 

 liquefied natural gas, and low-technology manufactures, although the 

 Soviets claim that tariff concessions (MFN) would permit large-scale 

 sales of their industrial products. Another important factor is the 

 extent to which the Soviet leadership is prepared to relax its emphasis 

 on military high-technology development, and how the United States 

 would be prepared to respond to such a relaxation if it occurred. High 

 technology in weaponry, like other forms of high technology, takes a 

 long time to mature and cannot easily be turned off for diplomatic 

 purposes. 



<» Hardt and HoUiday, V.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations, Vo]. I, p. 601. 



"2 Ibid., p. 573. 



«3 ]bU., pp. 572-584, especially p. 573. 



